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1980 SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
PATRICIA J. YOUNGBLOOD* 
1980 brought considerable attention to one painful episode in 
modern international relations: the attack on the United States 
Embassy and the holding hostage of United States diplomatic and 
military personnel in Iran by militant students, an act ratified by 
the government of Iran. The hostage-taking violated one of the 
most cherished principles of international law: the inviolability of 
diplomatic and consular personnel and premises. The Carter Ad-
ministration's response to the Embassy attack - the freezing of 
Iranian assets within this country, and the agreement between the 
United States and Iran that ended the crisis - unfreezing the 
assets and barring claims against Iran in United States courts, 
spawned significant litigation in 1980 and 1981. 
As important and engaging as the hostage crisis was during 
1980, it was not the only issue with international overtones con-
fronting state and federal courts that year. The purpose of this ar-
ticle is to survey those cases decided in 1980 by the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals and federal district courts in New York1 that in-
volved or impacted upon international law, international relations, 
or international commerce. A few of these cases presented what 
traditionally have been considered universal principles of interna-
tional law. Most of the cases raised issues akin to those found in a 
survey of domestic law - jurisdictional questions, due process 
challenges, choice of law problems - which are appropriate for 
discussion in this survey because they arise in the international 
arena and thus implicate political and legal values foreign to our 
domestic law. 
L THE IRANIAN ASSETS LIT/GA TION2 
On November 4, 1979, the American Embassy in Tehran, Iran 
• Ass't Prof., Albany Law School of Union University; J.D. Williamette University 
College of Law, 1978; L.L.M. Harvard Law School, 1980. The author gratefully 
acknowledges the research assistance of Catherine Gabriels, candidate for J .D., Albany 
Law School, 1983. 
1. In future years, this Survey will include significant cases involving international 
law decided by New York state courts. No such cases were decided in 1980. 
2. The Iranian assets litigation discussed below spanned three calendar years, 
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was seized and American diplomatic personnel were captured by 
militant Iranian students. The seizure of the Embassy and the 
holding hostage of the personnel violated customary international 
law3 and numerous treaties to which both the United States and 
Iran were signatories.4 
On November 14, 1979, with relations between the United 
States and Iran already strained, Iran announced its intention to 
withdraw its funds from American banks and their overseas 
branches. The same day, President Carter, acting pursuant to the 
International Emergency Economic Power Act (IEEPA),5 declared 
1979-1981. Because the events that spawned the litigation represented a single and unique 
chapter in our political and legal history, the litigation is treated as a whole in the 1980 
Survey. 
3. See, Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran 
(United States of America v. Iran), Judgment of May 24, 1980, [1980] I.C.J. Rep. 3, 42-43. The 
Order and Judgment are reprinted at 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 266 (Order), 746 (Judgment) (1980). 
4. Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, United States-Iran, 
Aug. 15, 1955, 8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853; Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 
and Optional Protocol on Disputes, April 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 
U.N.T.S. 95; Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes, 
April 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. 
5. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (Supp. 1978). The IEEPA is the most recent in a series of 
attempts by Congress to define the Executive's power in dealing with international 
emergencies. The first modern Congressional effort was the Trading With the Enemy Act 
(TWEA) (50 U.S.C. § 95a, currently codified as 50 U.S.C. § 1, app. et seq). TWEA gave the 
Executive broad emergency powers but contained no criteria for determining when a na-
tional emergency existed. A recent commentator on the Iranian assets litigation noted that 
the latitude provided by the Act: 
became increasingly apparent as successive Presidents declared "national 
emergencies" in all manner of difficult situations, domestic as well as international: 
e.g., President Truman, in 1950, declared a national emergency in connection with 
the Korean War; President Johnson, in 1968, cited President Truman's declaration 
of national emergency as precedent for wideranging measures to correct an ongo-
ing balance of payments deficit; President Nixon, in 1970, invoked section 5(b) as 
authority for mobilizing National Guard units during a strike by Post Office 
employees and, in 1971, in order to implement a ten percent import duty sur-
charge. 
Gordon, Freeze, Thaw May Squeeze Law: What's Happening to Those Iranian Assets, 12 
Int'l Practitioner's Ntbk. 1, 2 (1980). 
After the Watergate scandal and the "imperial presidency" of Richard Nixon, Con-
gress passed two bills intended to limit and define the Executive's power in emergencies. First 
was the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1605 et seq. (Supp. 1980). It requires 
the President to indicate, once he declares a national emergency, the specific provisions of 
law under which he proposes to act in dealing with the emergency. 50 U.S.C. § 1631. The 
IEEPA, enacted a year later, requires that any emergency declared under the National 
Emergencies Act must constitute an "unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its 
source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, 
foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national 
emergency with respect to such threat." 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (a) (Supp. 1980). For an expanded 
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a national emergency and blocked the removal or transfer of "all 
property and interests in property of the Government of Iran, its 
instrumentalities and controlled entities and the Central Bank of 
Iran which are or become subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States .... "6 On November 15, 1979, the Treasury Department, 
pursuant to presidential authorization, promulgated a regulation 
to implement the blocking order. The regulation contained two 
critical provisions which would underlie nearly all the subsequent 
Iranian assets litigation. First, it provided that "[u]nless licensed 
or authorized ... any attachment, judgment, decree, lien, execu-
tion, garnishment, or other judicial process is null and void with 
respect" to property in which Iran had an interest on or after the 
blocking order.7 Second, the regulation provided that any license 
or authorization issued could be "amended, modified, or revoked 
at any time."7a 
The President granted a general license on November 26, 
1979, authorizing certain judicial proceedings against Iran but pro-
hibiting the entry of any judgment, decree, or order of similar ef-
fect.8 Three weeks later, the Treasury Department issued a clari-
fying regulation stating "the general authorization for judicial pro-
ceedings ... includes pre-judgment attachment."9 
The effect of the President's authorization on the dockets of 
federal courts was immediate. In the first months after the 
authorization, over 100 lawsuits were filed by companies seeking 
attachment of Iranian assets under United States jurisdiction.10 
The claims asserted in these lawsuits were estimated to total over 
three billion dollars.11 By September of 1980, ninety-six civil ac-
analysis of the IEEPA and the history of Executive emergency powers generally, see, Gor-
don, The Blocking of Iranian Assets, 14 Int'l L. 659, 662-671 (1980). 
6. Exec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65729 (1979). The specific authority for the 
President's order is 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (a)(l)(B) (Supp. II 1978), which empowers the President 
to: 
investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any ac-
quisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importa-
tion or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege 
with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign coun-
try or a national thereof has any interest .... 
7. 31 CFR § 535.203(e) (1980) (emphasis added). 
7a. 31 CFR § 535.805 (1980). 
8. 31 CFR § 535.504(a)(c) (1980). 
9. 31 CFR § 535.418 (1980). 
10. Wall St. J., Feb. 6, 1980, at 18, col. 1. 
11. Id. 
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tions against Iran or its instrumentalities were pending in the 
Southern District of New York alone.12 It is therefore impossible 
to treat all, or even most, of the cases in a survey article. For this 
reason, three cases, raising the most common issues in the Iranian 
assets litigation,- have been chosen for scrutiny here. The first is 
New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation & 
Transmission Co.,13 which involved Iran's claim of immunity from 
prejudgment attachment of its assets. The second is Marschalk v. 
Iran National Airlines Corp., et al/4 decided by Judge Kevin Duffy 
of the Southern District of New York. Third is Dames & Moore v. 
Regan,15 recently decided by the United States Supreme Court. 
The latter two cases are perfectly suited for a survey article 
because, while each opinion is well-reasoned, the District Court 
and Supreme Court reached opposite conclusions in resolving 
identical legal issues. The reader thus has an opportunity to 
understand the competing arguments for and against the power, 
statutory and constitutional, of President Carter (and later, Presi-
dent Reagan) to deal with Iranian authorities as he did in the early 
and final stages of the hostage crisis. 
A. Initial Challenges: Immunity from Prejudgment 
Attachment 
The first issue raised in the litigation initiated after President 
Carter's issuance of a general license to sue was whether the 
State of Iran16 was entitled to immunity from prejudgment attach-
ment of its assets. In an effort to prevent the removal of Iranian 
assets from the jurisdiction of the court, the plaintiffs in New 
England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power applied for and were 
granted orders of attachment.11 Plaintiffs then moved to confirm 
12. Marschalk v. Iran National Airlines Corp., et al., 518 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
13. 502 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
14. 518 F. Supp. at 69. 
15. _U.S._, 101 S. Ct. 2972. 
16. Throughout the discussion of immunity, any reference to Iran includes not only 
the State of Iran but also its agencies and instrumentalities. See, Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (1980). 
17. Plaintiffs in the ninety-six cases filed in the Southern District of New York were 
granted orders of attachment pursuant to article 62 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. N. 
Y. C1v. PRAC. LAW§§ 6201 et seq. (McKinney 1980). Attachment in federal court is available 
"under the circumstances and in the manner provided by the law of the state in which the 
district court is held, existing at the time the remedy is sought." Fed. R. Civ. P. 64. Plain-
tiffs did not seek attachment as a jurisdictional predicate. They relied on 28 U.S.C. 
4
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and defendants moved to vacate these orders.18 The cases in the 
Southern District of New York were consolidated before Judge 
Duffy for the sole purpose of determining the immunity question. 
Judge Duffy held that defendants could not claim immunity from 
prejudgment attachment. 
Defendants claimed that, by virtue of the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act (FSIA), 19 their assets were immune from pre-
judgment attachment. Four separate immunities - jurisdictional 
immunity, immunity from prejudgment attachment, immunity 
from postjudgment attachment, and immunity from execution 
upon a judgment - are covered by the FSIA. Prejudgment im-
munity is the subject of 28 U.S.C. Section 1610(d), which provides 
that the assets of a foreign state (or its agencies and instrumen-
talities) are immune from attachment before judgment unless such 
immunity is explicitly waived by the foreign state.20 In contrast, 
the FSIA provides that waiver of immunity from postjudgment at-
tachment may be either explicit or implicit.21 The parties agreed 
that the only possible source of an explicit waiver of Iran's pre-
judgment attachment immunity would be the Treaty of Amity, 
Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the United 
States and Iran.22 In that treaty, each party expressly waives "im-
munity ... from taxation, suit, execution of judgment or other 
liability to which privately owned and controlled enterprises are 
§§ 1330 (a) and 1331 (1980) as a basis of subject matter jurisdiciton and 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (b) as 
the basis of personal jurisdiction. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power 
Generation and Transmission Co., 502 F. Supp. 120, 123, n.4. 
18. Many of the orders of attachment were sought prior to communication with defen-
dants and thus prior to retention of counsel by defendants. These orders were granted ex 
parte. Other applications for orders were sought after counsel had been obtained by the 
various defendants and were issued only after notice to defendants. The New York Civil 
Practice Law and Rules distinguish between these two types of orders. Where an order of 
attachment is issued ex parte, the party requesting the order must move to confirm the at-
tachment within five days. N.Y. C1v. PRAC. LAW§ 6211 (b). Where the order is issued upon 
notice, the initial burden is on the defendant to move to vacate the attachment. N.Y. C1v. 
PRAC. LAW§ 6223 (a). See, New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation 
and Transmission Company, 502 F. Supp. 120, 123, n.3. 
19. 28 u.s.c. §§ 1602-1611 (1980). 
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (d) also requires that the purpose of the attachment be to secure a 
judgment that may be entered. 
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (a)(l), (b)(l). 
22. Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, United States - Iran, 
done Aug. 15, 1955, 8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853 (effective June 16, 1957). 
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subject therein .... "23 This section clearly does not constitute an 
explicit waiver of immunity from prejudgment attachment. As the 
court noted: 
Congress recognized that pre-judgment attachment is an ex-
traordinary and harsh remedy not to be lightly waived. Instead, 
only the clearest of waivers will subject a foreign state to this 
extraordinary remedy .24 
The fact that the Treaty did not explicitly waive immunity 
from prejudgment attachment as required by the FSIA did not 
end the court's inquiry. The FSIA expressly provides that ex-
isting international agreements to which the United States was a 
party at the time of the FSIA's enactment would survive.25 Thus, 
"insofar as a foreign state had previously waived its sovereign im-
munity from jurisdiction, attachment or execution of judgment, by 
agreement with the United States, these waivers still control on 
the question of immunity ."26 The court therefore had to resolve a 
further question: did Iran implicitly waive immunity from pre-
judgment attachment in the Treaty? Here the court parted com-
pany with at least two other courts faced with the question. 27 In 
considering the issue, the court'put great emphasis on the nature 
of the remedy involved. 
[P]re-judgment attachment, as with the other provisional 
remedies, is unique in that it affords plaintiff a substantial 
measure of relief absent a final determination that plaintiff is en-
titled to any relief whatsoever. Moreover, the provisional 
remedies are too potentially harassing to be freely granted. For 
these reasons, the courts have long adopted the view that "ow-
ing to the statutory origin and harsh nature of [these remedies]," 
they are to be construed "in accordance with the general rule ap-
plicable to statutes in derogation of the common law, strictiy in 
favor of those against whom [they] may be employed."28 
23. Id. art. XI, para. 4. 
24. 502 F. Supp. 120, 126. 
25. 28 u.s.c. §§ 1604, 1609 (1976). 
26. 502 F. Supp. 120, 125. 
27. See, American International Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 493 F. Supp. 
522 (D.D.C. 1980); Behring International v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 475 F. Supp. 383 
(D.N.J. 1979). 
28. 502 F. Supp. 120, 126-127 (quoting Penoyar v. Kelsey, 150 N.Y. 77, 79-80 (1896)). 
The court emphasized that as a matter of contractual, rather than statutory, interpretation 
the consent to waive immunity must be express and strictly construed (citing United States 
v. New York Rayon Importing Co., 329 U.S. 654, 659 (1947)). 
6
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Applying the principle of strict construction, the court could not 
conclude that the parties to the Treaty contemplated waiving im-
munity from prejudgment attachment.29 
Having so ruled, the court then turned to the question 
whether the President's actions in response to the hostage crisis 
affected Iran's sovereign immunity. The court noted that 
sovereign immunity is a privilege granted to foreign governments 
as a matter of comity.30 As "[s]overeign immunity, at the bare 
minimum, means that the sovereign may do with its own property 
as it wishes,"31 the court concluded that the President's order 
blocking transfer of all Iranian property was intended to and did 
suspend the sovereign immunity normally granted to Iran, at least 
as far as that property was concerned.32 
After issuing his opinion, Judge Duffy, upon request by the 
parties, certified the issue of immunity from prejudgment attach-
ment to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.33 On January 5, 1981, 
the Court of Appeals accepted interlocutory review of the cer-
tified question and stayed all proceedings in district courts pend-
ing its decision. 34 
At approximately the same time the Iranian assets cases 
were being filed in federal court in New York, Dames & Moore, a 
company whose wholly-owned subsidiary had contracted to render 
services for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), filed 
suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of 
California against the AEOI, the government of Iran, and a 
number of Iranian banks for payments due under the contract.35 
Upon the request of plaintiff, the district court issued orders of 
attachment against the property of defendants.36 
B. The United States-Iran Agreement and Subsequent 
Executive Orders 
On January 20, 1981, Iran and the United States entered into 
29. 502 F. Supp. 120, 127. 
30. Id. at 129. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 130. 
33. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Transmission 
Co., 508 F. Supp. 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
34. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Transmission 
Co., 646 F.2d 779, 782 (2d Cir. 1981). 
35. See, Dames & Moore v. Regan,_ U.S._, 101 S. Ct. 2972, 2979 (1981). 
36. Id. 
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an "Agreement" under which the hostages were released.37 As 
part of the Agreement, the United States obligated itself 
to terminate all legal proceedings in United States courts involv-
ing claims of United States persons and institutions against Iran 
and its state enterprises, to nullify all attachments and 
judgments obtained therein, to prohibit all further litigation 
based on such claims, and to bring about the termination of such 
claims through binding arbitration.38 
The Agreement also provided that the United States would "act 
to bring about" the transfer to Iran by July 19, 1981 of all Iranian 
assets held in the domestic branches of American banks.39 In addi-
tion, the Agreement called for the establishment of an Iran-United 
States Claims Tribunal which would arbitrate any claim not settl-
ed within six months.40 President Carter sought to implement the 
Agreement through a series of Executive Orders.41 These orders 
revoked all licenses permitting the exercise of 
"any right, power, or privilege" with regard to Iranian funds, 
securities, or deposits; "nullified" all non-Iranian interests in 
such assets acquired subsequent to the blocking order of 
November 14, 1979; and required those banks holding Iranian 
assets to transfer them "to the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, to be held or transferred as directed by the Secretary of 
the Treasury ."42 
After taking office, President Reagan ratified these Executive 
Orders and "suspended [all] claims except as they may be 
presented to the [claims] tribunal."43 
The effect of these orders on New England Nat'l Bank v. 
37. The Agreement is embodied in two Declarations: Declaration of the Government 
of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria; Declaration of the Government of the 
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlements of Claims by the 
Governments of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran. [Hereinafter cited as "Agreement".) 
38. Agreement cited in_ U.S._, 101 S. Ct. 2972, 2979-2980 (1981). 
39. Agreement cited in_ U.S._, 101 S. Ct. at 2980. 
40. Id. 
41. Executive Orders No's. 12,276-12,285, 46 Fed. Reg. 7913-32 (1981). 
42. Agreement, quoted at _ U.S. _ , 101 St. Ct. at 2980 (1981). 
43. Exec. Order No. 12,294, 42 Fed. Reg. 14111 (1981). The suspension of any such 
claim terminates if the Tribunal decides it has no jurisdiction over the claim. When the 
Tribunal awards a recovery which is paid or determines that no recovery is due, the claim is 
discharged for all purposes. Id. 
8
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Iran Power Generation and Transmission was uncomplicated. The 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals determined that a single question 
supplanted the questions that had been certified by Judge Duffy: 
"Were the actions of the President in suspending the lawsuits and 
nullifying the attachments consistent with constitutional power 
and any applicable statutory authority?"44 The Second Circuit 
declined to rule on the question since the issue had not been 
presented to or decided by the lower court. Rather, the court 
remanded the cases to Judge Duffy with directions to select and 
decide one of the pending cases that squarely presented the issue. 
The judge was also directed to .join the United States as a party.45 
The Dames & Moore litigation in California took a more com-
plicated path after the Agreement and Executive Orders were 
signed.46 The District Court granted plaintiffs motion for sum-
mary judgment against two of the defendants in late January. 
Plaintiff immediately sought writs of garnishment and execution 
in Washington State against Iranian property located in that 
state. Concurrently, plaintiff filed a second suit in the California 
District Court against the United States and Secretary of the 
Treasury, Donald Regan, seeking to prevent the enforcement of 
the Executive Orders and Treasury regulations implementing the 
Agreement. The District Court denied the motion for a 
preliminary injunction, dismissed the claim, stayed the execution 
of its earlier summary judgment, and vacated all prejudgment at-
tachments. The day after the appeal from these rulings was 
docketed in the Ninth Circuit, the Department of the Treasury 
amended its regulations to require the transfer of Iranian financial 
assets in the United States to the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York by June 19, 1981.47 The District Court then "entered an in-
junction pending appeal prohibiting the United States from re-
quiring the transfer of Iranian property that is subject to any writ 
of attachment, garnishment, judgment, levy, or other judicial lien, 
issued by any court in favor of petitioner." 48 The petitioner sought 
' a writ of certiorari before judgment49 from the United States 
44. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power, 646 F.2d 779, 783 (2d Cir. 
1981). 
45. 646 F .2d 779, 784. 
46. The procedural history of Dames & Moore is set out at_ U.S._, 101 S. Ct. 
2972, 2980 (1981). 
47. Id. at 2981. 
48. Id. 
49. 28 U.S.C. § 2101 (e). 
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Supreme Court. The Court granted the petition for writ.50 
The Supreme Court and Judge Duffy were presented with 
the same issues but reached opposite results. Although the 
Court's decision most likely wholly overruled Judge Duffy's, in the 
analysis of the issues that follows, the rationale behind each 
court's conclusions will be examined in order that the reader 
might understand the competing legal arguments and constitu-
tional values at stake. 
Both courts began their consideration of the major issues 
presented by the Presidents' actions by reviewing the scope of 
presidential power described by Justice Jackson in his concurring 
opinion in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer.51 Justice 
Jackson's concurrence identified three relationships between Con-
gress and the Executive, each of which demands a separate stand-
ard of review by the Judiciary in determining the authority of the 
President to act in a given case.52 Recognizing, as Justice Jackson 
did, that it represents "a somewhat over-simplified grouping,"53 
the Court in Dames & Moore v. Regan paraphrased the 
trichotomy: 
When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied 
authorization from Congress, he exercises not only his powers 
but also those delegated by Congress. In such a case the ex-
ecutive action "would be supported by the strongest of presump-
tions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the 
burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might at-
tack it." When the President acts in the absence of congressional 
authorization he may enter "a zone of twilight in which he and 
Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its 
distribution is uncertain." In such a case the analysis becomes 
more complicated, and the validity of the President's action, at 
least so far as separation of powers principles are concerned, 
hinges on a consideration of all the circumstances which might 
shed light on the views of the Legislative Branch toward such ac-
tion, including "congressional inertia, indifference or 
50. _U.S._, 101 S. Ct. at 3132 (1981). One of the factors probably motivating the 
Court to grant the petition was the information conveyed to the Court by the Solicitor 
General that if the United States failed to act prior to July 19, 1981, Iran would consider the 
United States to be in breach of the Agreement. 
51. 343 U.S. 579, 634-655 (1952). (Jackson, J. , concurring.) 
52. 343 U.S. at 635-638. 
53. 343 U.S. at 635. 
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quiescence." Finally, when the President acts in contravention of 
the will of Congress, "his power is at its lowest ebb," and the 
Court can sustain his actions "only by disabling the Congress 
from acting upon the subject."54 
C. Did the President Have Statutory or Constitutional Authority 
to Nullify the Attachments and Order the Transfer of Iranian 
Assets? 
1. DAMES & MOORE V. REGAN 
The Supreme Court held that the President had authority 
under the IEEP A to issue both the order freezing and the order . 
releasing and transferring the Iranian assets. This conclusion was 
based on the "plain language" of section 1702 of the IEEPA which 
authorizes the President to "nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any 
acquisition ... transfer ... or [exercise of] any right, power or 
privilege" with respect to foreign property within the United 
States.55 The Court rejected petitioner's assertion that under sec-
tion 1702 the President, once having blocked the assets, was em-
powered only to continue or discontinue the block.56 
Acknowledging that the IEEP A was intended to limit the 
President's emergency powers in peacetime under the Trading 
With the Enemy Act (TWEA),57 the Court nonetheless concluded 
that these limitations did not affect the authority of the President 
to act as he did in regard to the Iranian assets.58 Because the Presi-
dent's action was taken pursuant to specific congressional 
authorization, under Justice Jackson's trifurcated standard of 
judicial review, petitioner had a heavy burden to overcome the 
strongest of presumptions;59 a burden, the Court held, petitioner 
failed to meet. 60 
54. _U.S._, 101 S. Ct. 2972, 2981 (1981). 
55. 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (a)(l)(B) (Supp. 1980); _U.S. _, 101 S. Ct. 2972, 2982 (1981). 
56. _U.S._, 101 S. Ct. 2972, 2983 (1981). Accord, Chas. T. Main Int'l, Inc. v. 
Khuzestan Water and Power Authority, 651 F.2d 800 (1st Cir. 1981); American Int'l Group, 
Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran,_ F.2d _ (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
57. 50 U.S.C. App.§§ 1-44 et seq. (1968 & Supp. 1980), originally codified as 50 U.S.C. 
§ 95a (1917). 
58. _U.S._, 101 S. Ct. at 2983. The Court pointed out that the petitioner pro-
ceeded against the blocked assets after the Treasury Department issued licenses authoriz-
ing such proceedings. Since the Treasury regulations expressly provided for the amend-
ment, modification or revocation of such licenses, "[p]etitioner was on notice of the con-
tingent nature of its interest in the frozen assets." Id. 
59. 343 U.S. 579, 637. 
60. _ U.S. _, 101 S. Ct. 2972, 2984 (1981). 
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2. MARSCHALK V. IRAN NAT'L AIRLINES CORP. 
While acknowledging that on its face the language of IEEPA 
could be read to authorize the President's actions, Judge Duffy 
concluded, on the basis of the legislative history of IEEPA, that 
the powers conferred by that act do not include nullification of the 
rights plaintiff had in the attached Iranian property.61 Although 
Congress did not make clear its purpose in including section 1702, 
the exact words of which were drawn from the Trading with the 
Enemy Act (TWEA),62 in the IEEPA, Judge Duffy found 
significance in the IEEPA's general purpose, which was to revise 
and delimit the President's authority to regulate international 
economic transactions during wars or national emergencies.63 
Even more significant was the legislative purpose behind the 
TWEA, which was to define, regulate, and punish trading with 
the enemy.64 "Neither the legislative history of the [Trading With 
the Enemy Act] nor any case falling under it indicate [sic] a 
presidential power to nullify a citizen's court-conferred rights in 
foreign property."65 Thus, in Judge Duffy's view, the President 
would have power under the IEEP A to nullify any interest an 
American citizen obtained in Iranian property through any tran-
saction with the Iranian owner after the freeze order but not an 
interest in Iranian property conveyed by a federal court. 66 
D. Did the President Have Statutory or Constitutional Authority 
to Suspend the Cl,aims of American Citizens Pending in 
American Courts? 
1. DAMES & MOORE V. REGAN 
The Government asserted the President's authority under 
the IEEP A and the "Hostages Act,"67 to suspend68 all claims pend-
61. Marschalk v. Iran Nat'l Airlines Corp., 518 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
62. 50 U.S.C. § 95a, currently codified as 50 U.S.C. App.§§ 1-44 et seq. 
63. 518 F. Supp. at 69, 96. 
64. 10 H.R. REP. No. 4960, 65th Cong., 1st Sess., Ch. 106, Pub. L. No. 6591, 40 Stat. 411 
(1917) (emphasis added). 
65. 518 F. Supp. at 70, 96. 
66. Id. at 97. 
67. 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1979), see note 71, infra. 
68. One of the arguments made by the Government throughout the Iranian assets 
litigation was that the claims of the various plaintiffs had been suspended rather than ter-
minated. The Agreement between the United States and Iran provided for the termination 
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ing in federal courts against the frozen Iranian assets. The Court 
concluded that the IEEP A did not authorize the suspension of 
claims since "claims of American citizens against Iran are not in 
themselves transactions involving Iranian property or efforts to 
exercise any rights with respect to such property ."69 An in per-
sonam lawsuit is aimed simply at establishing liability and is not 
focused on any particular property in the jurisdiction.70 While 
acknowledging that the broad language of the Hostages Act could 
be read to cover the President's action, the Court was "reluctant 
to conclude" that it gave specific authorization for the suspension 
of claims.71 The legislative history did not suggest an intent on the 
part of Congress to cover a situation like the Iranian hostage 
crisis.72 
Although the IEEP A and Hostages Act do not specifically 
authorize the suspension of claims in American courts, the Court 
did not find them "entirely irrelevant to the question of the validi-
ty of the President's actions."73 Rather, they were highly relevant 
of legal proceedings. President Reagan, in Executive Order No. 12,294, suspended all 
claims. The distinction, while troubling to Judge Duffy, did not affect the resolution of any 
issue in either Marschalk or Dames & Moore. 
69. _U.S. _, 101 S. Ct. 2972, 2984-85 (1981). 
70. Id. Every court considering this question in Iranian assets litigation has reached a 
Similar conclusion. Chas T. Main Int'l, Inc., v. Khuzestan Water and Power Authority, 651 
F.2d 800 (1st Cir. 1981); American Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, __ F.2d __ 
n.15; Marschalk v. Iran National Airlines, 518 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Electronic Data 
System v. Social Security Organization of Iran, 508 F. Supp. 1350, 1363 (N.D. Tex. 1981). 
71. __ U.S. __ , 101 S. Ct. at 2985. The Hostages Act provides: 
Whenever it is made known to the President that any citizen of the United 
States has been unjustly deprived of his liberty by or under the authority of any 
foreign government, it shall be the duty of the President forthwith to demand of 
that government the reasons of such imprisonment; and if it appears to be 
wrongful and in violation of the rights of American citizenship, the President shall 
forthwith demand the release of such citizen, and if the release so demanded is 
unreasonably delayed or refused, the President shall use such means, not amount-
ing to acts of war, as he may think necessary and proper to obtain or effectuate the 
release, and all the facts and proceedings relative thereto shall as soon as prac-
ticable be communicated by the President to Congress. 
22 u.s.c. § 1732. 
72. ~U.S._, 101 S. Ct. at 2985. 
Although the Iranian hostage-taking violated international law and common decen-
cy, the hostages were not seized out of any r~fusal to recognize their American 
citizenship- they were seized precisely because of their American citizenship. The 
legislative history is also somewhat ambiguous on the question whether Congress 
contemplated presidential action such as that involved here or rather simply 
reprisals directed against the offending foreign country and its citizens. 
Id. See, e.g. CONG. GLOBE 4205, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. (1868). 
13. _U.S._, 101 S. Ct. at 2986. 
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as an indication of "congressional acceptance of a broad scope for 
executive action in circumstances such as those presented in this 
case."74 Citing Haig v. Agee,75 the Court noted that, in the areas of 
foreign policy and national security, a lack of specific congres-
sional authorization for an executive act does not indicate congres-
sional disapproval of that act. "On the contrary, the enactment of 
legislation closely related to the question of the President's 
authority in a particular case which evinces legislative intent to 
accord the President broad discretion may be considered to 'invite 
measures of independent presidential authority.' "76 
It has long been the practice of the United States to enter in-
to agreements with other nations to settle claims of the parties' 
respective nationals.77 The agreements sometimes take the form of 
treaties but often are executive agreements reached without the 
advice and consent of the Senate.78 "Crucial to [the Court's opinion] 
is the conclusion that Congress has implicitly approved the prac-
tice of claim settlement by executive agreement."79 The Court 
found certain statutory enactments and continued congressional 
acquiescence in the practice to be evidence of such approval. First, 
the Congress in 1949 enacted the International Claims Settlement 
Act.80 Through the Act, Congress created the International Claims 
Commission81 and gave it jurisdiction to hear and decide claims by 
United States nationals against settlement funds established 
74. Id. 
75. _U.S._, 101 S. Ct. 2777 (1981). 
76. Id. (quoting in part Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 
(1952)). 
77. - U.S.-· 101 s. Ct. at 2986. See also, L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 262 (1972); 14 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 247 (1970). These 
agreements include: 30 U.S.T. 1957 (1979) (People's Republic of China); 27 U.S.T. 3993 (1976) 
(Peru); 27 U.S.T. 4214 (1976) (Egypt); 25 U.S.T. 227 (1974) (Peru); 24 U.S.T. 522 (1973) 
(Hungary); 20 U.S.T. 2654 (1969) (Japan); 16 U.S.T. 1 (1965) (Yugoslavia); 14 U.S.T. 969 (1963) 
(Bulgaria); 11U.S.T.1953 (1960) (Poland); 11 U.S.T. 317 (1960) (Rumania). 
78. _ U.S. _, 101 S. Ct. at 2987. The Court acknowledged that many of the set-
tlement agreements cited were consented to by the claimants but noted that the '"United 
States has sometimes disposed of the claims of citizens without their consent, or even 
without consultation with them, usually without exclusive regard for their interests, as 
distinguished from those of the nation as a whole.'" Id. (quoting L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AF-
FAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 262, 263 (1972)). Accord, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 2313 (1965). 
79. _U.S._, 101 S. Ct. at 2987. 
80. 22 U.S.C. §§ 1621-1644m (1979 & Supp. 1980). 
81. The International Claims Commission is now the Foreign Claims Settlement Com-
mission. 
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through settlement agreements.82 The Court concluded that, by 
creating this procedure, Congress had given its approval to settle-
ment agreements. The fact that Congress continued to accept the 
President's claim settlement authority, despite numerous amend-
ments to the International Claims Settlement Act, further sup-
ported this conclusion. Additional support for congressional ap-
proval was found in the legislative history of the IEEPA which 
stated "nothing in this Act is intended to interfere with the 
authority of the President to continue blocking assets ... or to im-
pede the settlement of claims of United States citizens against 
foreign countries."83 
Petitioner had raised two strong arguments against the con-
clusion that Congress acquiesced in the practice of claim settle-
ment by executive agreement. First, petitioner contended that 
reliance on practice prior to 1952 was misplaced in light of changes 
in the doctrine of sovereign immunity subsequent to that date.84 
Acknowledging that this contention was "not wholly without 
merit," the Court nonetheless found it was refuted by the 
post-1952 practice of claim settlement through executive agree-
ment. 
Petitioner's second assertion was that Congress divested the 
President of authority in this area when it enacted the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA),85 which gives federal district 
courts jurisdiction over commercial suits against foreign states 
that have waived immunity. Petitioner contended that by suspend-
ing claims against Iran, the President circumscribed the jurisdic-
tion of the courts, thereby violating article III of the 
Constitution.86 The Court rejected this contention stating that the 
effect of the President's order was to suspend claims, not divest 
the courts of jurisdiction. The President had simply changed the 
82. _U.S._, 101 S. Ct. 2987 (citing 22 U.S.C. § 1623(a)). 
83. _U.S._, 101 S. Ct. at 2989 (citing S. REP. No. 95-466, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 
(1977)). 
84. _U.S._, 101 S. Ct. at 2989. Prior to 1952, the United States adhered to the 
doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity. As a result, the only avenue for recourse against a 
foreign government was through a settlement agreement. In 1952, the United States 
adopted a restricted view of sovereign immunity. Thus, citizens had a judicial remedy, 
albeit limited, and therefore no longer had to rely exclusively on the Executive to pursue 
their claims. 
85. _U.S._, 101 S. Ct. at 2989, (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602 (Supp. 1980)). 
86. _U.S._, 101 S. Ct. at 2989. 
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substantive law governing the lawsuit.87 In addition, the Court 
noted that the FSIA was enacted to eliminate only one barrier to 
suit, that is sovereign immunity; it was not enacted to prohibit the 
President from settling claims against foreign governments.88 
The Court concluded that the President was authorized to 
suspend pending claims. 
As Justice Frankfurter pointed out in Youngstown, "a 
systematic, unbroken executive practice, long pursued to the 
knowledge of Congress and never before questioned . .. may be 
treated as a gloss on 'Executive Power' vested in the President 
by§ 1 of Art. II." Past practice does not, by itself, create power, 
but "long-continued practice, known to and acquiesced in by Con-
gress, would raise a presumption that the [action] has been 
[taken] in pursuance of its consent .... " Such practice is present 
here and such a presumption is also appropriate.89 
Having so concluded, the Court cautioned against too broad a 
reading of its holding or analysis. 
We do not decide that the President possesses plenary power to 
settle claims, even as against foreign governmental entities .... 
But where, as here, the settlement of claims has been deter-
mined to be a necessary incident to the resolution of a major 
foreign policy dispute between our country and another, and 
where, as here, we can conclude that Congress acquiesced in the 
President's action, we are not prepared to say that the President 
lacks the power to settle such claims.90 
2. MARSCHALK V. IRAN NAT'L AIRLINES CORP. 
Judge Duffy not only refused to find express authority for the 
President's action suspending claims in the IEEP A but read that 
87. The Court used sovereign immunity to support its point. "No one would suggest 
that a determination of sovereign immunity divests the federal courts of 'jurisdiction.' Yet 
petitioner's argument, if accepted, would have required courts prior to the enactment of the 
FSIA to reject as an encroachment on their jurisdiction the President's determination of a 
foreign state's sovereign immunity." Id. 
88. Indeed, in considering enactment of the FSIA, the court noted that Congress con-
sidered and rejected proposals to limit this executive power. Id. n. 11. See Congressional 
Oversight of Executive Agreements: Hearings on S. 632 and S. 1251 before the Subcommit-
tee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 
243-261, 302-311 (1975); Congressional Review of International Agreements, Hearings before 
theSubcomm. on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Comm. on Inter-
national Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 167, 246 (1976). 
89. _U.S._, 101 S. Ct. 2972, 2990 (citations omitted). 
90. Id. at 2991. 
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act as indicating a legislative intent to prohibit such action.91 Addi-
tionally, the FSIA was read by Judge Duffy to prohibit the 
suspension of claims. 
This conclusion was drawn in large part from the legislative 
history of the FSIA. The original draft of the FSIA, proposed by 
the Departments of Justice and State, provided that the act would 
be "subject to existing and future international agreements."92 
The reference to future international agreements was deleted in 
committee. Judge Duffy reasoned "[i]t would be totally in-
congruous if Congress took away from the executive the power to 
dispose of certain lawsuits against foreign governments by 'sug-
gestions of immunity' and yet intended to permit the same by in-
ternational executive agreements."93 
Unlike the Supreme Court in Dames & Moore, the district 
court engaged in an extensive analysis of the constitutionality of 
the President's suspension of claims in United States courts. 
Because Judge Duffy viewed the President's action not only as 
lacking congressional authorization, but also as incompatible with 
the will of Congress, the President's authority, according to 
Justice Jackson's analysis in Youngstown, could be based only 
upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional 
powers possessed by Congress in the matter.94 "In this situation, 
the President's power is 'at its lowest ebb' and the assertion of 
such power 'must be scrutinized with caution .... ' "95 
Recognizing that the executive's powers in foreign affairs ex-
tend beyond those specifically enumerated in the Constitution,96 
Judge Duffy turned to the question of "whether the Executive 
Agreement and Presidential Orders terminating this litigation do 
in fact upset 'the equilibrium established by our constitutional 
system' by infringing upon the powers of Congress and the 
judiciary."97 Judge Duffy concluded that the President's action in-
fringed upon both. Article III, section 2 of the United States Con-
stitution extends the judicial power of the federal courts to all 
91. 518 F. Supp. at 79. 
92. H.R. 11315, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1604 (1976). 518 F. Supp. at 82. 
93. 518 F. Supp. at 82. 
94. Id. at 84. 343 U.S. 579, 637. (Jackson, J., concurring). 
95. 518 F. Supp. at 84. 
96. Id. at 85, (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exporting Corp., 299 U.S. 304 
(1936)). 
97. Id. at 86. 
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cases between "a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign 
States, Citizens or Subjects." The Constitution additionally pro-
vides that the jurisdiction of the federal courts shall be defined by 
the Congress.98 Despite the constitutional and congressional 
authority given the federal courts over the claims in the Iranian 
assets litigation, "[t]he government ... contend[s] that the Presi-
dent has the authority to suspend litigation in United States 
courts and transfer claims to a tribunal under his broad and 
plenary authority to conduct foreign affairs."99 The government's 
contention in the district court was based on the presidential 
power to settle claims of American nationals against foreigners. 
Judge Duffy was not as willing as the Supreme Court in Dames & 
Moore 100 to accept either the asserted scope of that power or its 
relevance to this case. First, Judge Duffy doubted that the Presi-
dent actually "settled" the claims of the plaintiffs against Iran.101 
Second, even if the claims were "settled", Congress in the FSIA 
had indicated disapproval of the practice.102 
Judge Duffy concluded that, 
To find that a President, by virtue of his foreign affairs power, 
can dictate the jurisdictional bounds of United States courts 
violates both the words and the objectives of our Constitution. 
The Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who has 
the authority to legislate the jurisdiction of the courts. The 
Founders of this Nation entrusted that responsibility to the Con-
gress. The Constitution does not subject this congressional 
power to presidential control in times of crisis. 103 
E. Did the President's Actions Suspending the Claims of 
American Citizens in Federal Courts Constitute a Taking of 
Property in Violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution in the Absence of Just Compensation? 
98. U.S. CONST. art. I§ 8. The congressional grant of jurisdiction in this case, accord-
ing to Judge Duffy, is 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330 and 1332 (but see Rugeirro, infra at 221-26.) and the 
Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, art. III§ 2, United States-Iran, 
Aug. 15, 1955, 8 U.S.T. 899, T.l.A.S. No. 3853. 
99. 518 F. Supp. at 85. 
100. See discussion supra at 173-7 4. 
101. 518 F. Supp. at 88. 
102. Id. at 91. 
103. Id. 
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1. DAMES & MOORE V. REGAN 
The Supreme Court refused to reach the merits of 
petitioner's contention that the President's suspension order ef-
fected an uncompensated taking of its claim in violation of the fifth 
amendment. Petitioner and the government conceded, and the 
Court held, that the issue was not yet ripe for review. The very 
possibility that the President's actions might effect a taking af 
property, however, made ripe the question whether petitioner will 
have a remedy in the Court of Claims under the Tucker Act104 if 
the action does represent such a taking .105 According to the 
Court's opinion in the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 106 
Court of Claims jurisdiction under the Tucker Act is presumed 
over claims arising under the Constitution, congressional acts, or 
executive regulations. One exception to the general presumption 
of jurisdiction is contained in section 1502 of the Tucker Act. 
Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the Court of 
Claims shall not have jurisdiction of any claim against the United 
States growing out of or dependent upon any treaty entered into 
with foreign nations.107 
At oral argument in Dames & Moore, the government conceded 
this exception would not bar petitioner's action in the Court of 
Claims.108 Without discussion, the Court agreed and held that "to 
the extent petitioner believes it has suffered an unconstitutional 
taking by the suspension of the claims, we see no jurisdictional 
obstacle to an appropriate action in the United States Court of 
Claims under the Tucker Act."109 
2. MARSCHALK V. IRAN NAT'L AIRLINES CORP. 
Judge Duffy rejected numerous contentions by the govern-
ment, holding that the President's order suspending claims ef-
fected an unconstitutional taking of plaintiff's property.11° First, 
the Government asserted that President Reagan's Executive 
104. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491-1506 (1976 and Supp. 1979). 
105. _ U.S. _, 101 S. Ct. at 2992. 
106. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974). 
107. 28 U.S.C. § 1502 (1976 and Supp. 1979). 
108. _U.S._, 101 S. Ct. at 2992. 
109. Id. 
110. 518 F. Supp. at 94. 
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Order111 did not terminate the lawsuit but rather suspended the 
claims. Labeling the practical distinction between terminating and 
suspending lawsuits as unclear, Judge Duffy concluded that con-
tracts and contract rights are property within the meaning of the 
fifth amendment and that the extinguishing of plaintiff's right to 
enforce its contract claim constituted a taking.112 
The Government argued that if the President's action ef-
fected a taking, plaintiff received value for it because he can bring 
the claim before an international tribunal with an increased 
chance of prevailing on the merits since Iran will not have 
available the defense of sovereign immunity or Act of State. 
Judge Duffy disagreed. 
Marschalk gains nothing by the alleged waiver by Iran of 
sovereign immunity or act of state defense. Under the FSIA and 
the Treaty of Amity, Iran is not entitled to those defenses in the 
United States courts when the proceedings involve a commercial 
claim. Furthermore, Marschalk must now pursue its claim in a 
foreign country which will undoubtedly increase the time and ex-
pense involved in the suit. More importantly, Marschalk must 
litigate its claim before an overtly political Tribunal without our 
constitutional guarantees of due process.113 
F. Analysis 
Whenever the Supreme Court is called upon to decide legal 
issues that arise from, and are closely related to, political events, 
troublesome questions are raised as to the proper role of the 
judiciary vis-d-vis the other branches of government. When the 
conduct of American foreign affairs is implicated in such cases, the 
Court's task is made more difficult. When, as here, the issues arise 
in a unique and dangerous political crisis, involving not only the 
prestige and reputation of the United States in the world com-
munity but the lives of American citizens as well, it is difficult not 
to be sympathetic to the position of the Court. Such sympathy, 
however, cannot give way to an uncritical acceptance of the 
Court's reasoning, for it is the essence of the Court's role to stand 
apart from political and national passions. Indeed, the purpose of 
111. Exec. Order No. 12,294, 46 Fed. Reg. 14,111 (1981). 
112. 518 F. Supp. at 93, (citing Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1933); United 
States v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 256 U.S. 51 (1921)). 
113. Id. at 93-94. 
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the Constitution, and thus of the Court sworn to interpret it, is to 
protect the individual from government not only in times of calm, 
but more importantly, in times of crisis. 
The Court's decision in Dames & Moore v. Regan may be 
criticized on exactly this ground. The hostage crisis imperiled the 
lives of the Americans held captive, at times threatened the peace 
of the world, and shook the foundations of international law. It did 
not, and could not, change the nature or extent of the rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution. Yet the Constitution seems to 
have played a very small role in the Court's analysis of the Presi-
dent's actions. This is not a novel criticism of the Court's inter-
pretation of the executive's power in foreign affairs. Yet this fact 
makes Dames & Moore more rather than less troubling. In the 
context of the its historical deference to the executive, the 
Court's cautionary language against reading its opinion too broad-
ly cannot be reassuring absent a thorough articulation of precisely 
what constitutional provision mandates or justifies such 
deference. This is not to say that the balance need be struck 
against the exercise of executive power; only that one is more con-
fident that a balance exists if the exercise of striking that balance 
is witnessed by those whose rights and interests are being weigh-
ed. 
Despite the absence of a thorough constitutional analysis, the 
rationale employed by the Court in Dames & Moore to uphold the 
Executive Orders gives some comfort to those who fear an expan-
sion of executive power. Since Justice Jackson's trichotomy 
formed the basis for the Court's analysis, the conclusion that the 
Executive Order represented a valid exercise of Presidential 
power is based largely on the supporting intent of Congress. Thus, 
if Congress acts to withdraw authorization for the kinds of action 
taken in response to the hostage crisis, the task of convincing the 
Court of the validity of such actions will be considerably more dif-
ficult. 
The Supreme Court's decision in Dames & Moore is only one 
chapter of the Iranian assets litigation. Some cases will be decided 
by the Claims Tribunal. If the Tribunal's resolution of American 
claims is viewed as unacceptable by the claimants, suits will 
doubtlessly be filed against the United States in the Court of 
Claims. Those suits falling outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal 
will be litigated in United States courts. The hostage crisis is over; 
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the legal problems caused by the severance of political and 
economic ties with Iran will continue for years. 
IL OTHER SELECTED CASES 
A. CRIMINAL MATTERS 
1. CALTAGIRONE V. GRANT 
Provisional Arrest of Roreign Nationals in United States 
Requires Showing of Probable Cause - Article XIII of the 
United States Extrad1-tion Treaty with Italy - Right of Party 
Requested to Enforce Foreign Arrest Warrant to Demand 
Additional Evidence and Information - Due Process 
Requirements in Provisional Arrest Cases 
In Caltagirone v. Grant, 114 the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals unanimously held that where the United States is asked as 
the "requested party" under the extradition treaty with Italy115 to 
"provisionally arrest" an Italian national pending a formal request 
for extradition by the Italian government, a showing of probable 
cause to arrest is required. The holding, which reversed the lower 
court, was grounded in the language of the statute rather than on 
a constitutional requirement. 
The Italian government learned in early 1980 that Francisco 
Caltagirone, an Italian national wanted in Italy on numerous 
charges arising out of his real estate dealings, was in the United 
States.116 The Italian government notified the United States 
Department of State that arrest warrants had been issued for 
Caltagirone in Italy and applied for a "provisional arrest" of 
Caltagirone pursuant to article XIII of Italy's extradition treaty 
with the United States, pending a possible request for formal ex-
114. 629 F.2d 739 (2nd Cir. 1980). 
115. Treaty on Extradition, done Jan. 18, 1973, United States-Italy, 26 U.S.T. 493, 
T.I.A.S. No. 8052 (effective March 11, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Treaty]. 
116. Caltagirone once operated the largest real estate development syndicate in Italy. 
The syndicate enjoyed the favor of Italian officials responsible for providing credit through 
a government lending institution. The corporations constituting the syndicate were heavily 
leveraged and thus the officials' support was critical to the fortunes of the syndicate. In 
1976 the government of Italy changed and the syndicate lost its access to easy government 
credit. By the fall of 1979, nineteen of the syndicate's companies were declared bankrupt. In 
early 1980, warrants issued for Caltagirone's arrest for fraudulent bankruptcy and par-
ticipation in embezzlement. Caltagirone left for the United States prior to the issuance of 
the warrants. Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d at 742. 
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tradition.117 A United States attorney prepared a complaint alleg-
ing the existence of the Italian warrant and applied to a United 
States District Court judge in the Southern District of New York 
for a warrant of arrest. No showing of probable cause to believe 
Caltagirone had committed a crime in Italy was attempted. The 
judge issued a warrant and Caltagirone was arrested.118 
Caltagirone unsuccessfully moved to quash the arrest war-
rant on the ground, inter alia, that it had been issued without 
probable cause.119 Three days later, Caltagirone renewed his mo-
tion and petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus .120 Both the motion 
and the petition were denied on the ground that his arrest in the 
United States was presumptively valid under Italian law.121 
Caltagirone immediately appealed to the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals. 
Prior to Caltagirone, the Second Circuit had consistently re-
quired a determination of probable cause in order to execute a for-
mal extradition.122 The writ of habeas corpus is available to test 
"whether there was any evidence warranting the finding that 
there was reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty ."123 In 
prior cases involving the validity of provisional arrest articles, the 
Second Circ_uit did not require a showing of probable cause.124 A 
complaint charging the accused with an extraditable offense, 
117. Id. at 742-743. 
118. Id. at 7 43. 
119. Id. 
120. The petition was made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1976). Subsection (c) of that 
statute provides in pertinent part: 
(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless-
(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the 
United States . . .. 
121. In re Caltagirone, 80 Cr. Misc. No. 1 (S.D.N.Y. March 26, 1980). 
122. Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1976); Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 
894 (2nd Cir. 1973); Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311 (1925). 
123. Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. at 312. 
The requirement that probable cause be shown in extradition proceedings is not unique 
to the Second Circuit. In Peroff v. Hylton, 542 F.2d 1247 (4th Cir. 1976), the court stated that 
"[t]he purpose of [an extradition hearing] is to inquire into the presence of probable cause to 
believe that there has been a violation of one or more of the criminal laws of the extraditing 
country, [and] that the alleged conduct, if committed in the United States, would have been 
a violation of our criminal law." Id. at 1249. 
See also Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d at 482. 
124. Ex parte Dinehart, 188 F. 858 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911); United States v. Marasco, 325 
F.2d 562 (2nd Cir. 1963). 
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coupled with a statement assuring the requested party that a for-
mal extradition request was forthcoming, was deemed sufficient to 
support provisional arrest of that person pending production of 
the appropriate documents.125 
Article XIII of the United States extradition treaty with Italy 
states that, "[i]n case of urgency a Contracting Party may apply 
for the provisional arrest of the person sought pending the presen-
tation of the request for extradition .... " The article further pro-
vides that an application for provisional arrest must contain four 
elements: a description of the person sought; an indication of in-
tention to request the extradition of the person sought; a state-
ment of the existence of a warrant for arrest against that person; 
and "such further information, if any, as would be necessary to 
justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest had the offense been 
committed ... in the territory of the requested Party ."126 The first 
three requirements were satisfied in the instant case.127 Only the 
final requirement was seriously in issue in Caltagirone. 
The Italian warrant was issued against Caltagirone on a 
charge of fraudulent bankruptcy. Such conduct is prohibited in the 
United States.128 To justify issuance of a warrant in this country, a 
showing of probable cause would have been required.129 Yet the 
government conceded and the record confirmed that no showing 
of probable cause was made prior to issuance of the warrant for 
petitioner's arrest. Italy's request for provisional arrest contained 
125. Ex parte Dinehart 188 F. at 859. 
126. Treaty, supra note 115, at 502. 
127. There was no doubt as to the identity of Caltagirone. According to the facts, upon 
learning of Caltagirone's presence in the U.S., Italy applied for his provisional arrest "pend-
ing a possible request for his extradition to Italy." Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d at 743. It is 
unclear whether the "possibility" of a formal extradition request satisfied the requirement 
of "intention to request formal extradition." Perhaps because Italy in fact made such a re-
quest upon expiration of the forty-five-day period of provisional detention, the court did not 
feel constrained to address the question. Id. at 749. 
The third requirement-that of a statement of the existence of a warrant-simply re-
quires a factual determination that such a warrant exists. Id. at 744. The court noted that 
the treaty does not contemplate review of the validity of the warrant under Italian law. On 
this issue, deference to foreign judicial determination is proper. Accordingly, the finding of 
the district court that a warrant had issued, which was based on the U.S. Attorney for the 
Southern District of New York's sworn complaint alleging its existence, was sufficient. Id. 
at 743, 744. 
128. 18 u.s.c. §§ 152, 656, 1006. 
129. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; FED. R. CRIM. P. 4. 
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no such "further information" as would support probable cause to 
believe that Caltagirone had committed an extraditable offense. 
The language of article XIII closely parallels that of article 
XI, the formal extradition article, which requires "such evidence 
as, according to the laws of the requested Party, would justify his 
arrest and committal for trial if the offense had been committed 
there .... "13° Construing the language of article XI as requiring a 
showing of probable cause, and noting the obvious parallel be-
tween it and the language of article XIII, the court concluded that 
the drafters of the extradition treaty contemplated a showing of 
probable cause under both articles in all cases where the United 
States is the "requested Party" whether the request is for provi-
sional arrest or formal extradition.181 
The government conceded that Italy must provide such "fur-
ther information" as would establish probable cause, but main-
tained that the information must be provided only to the executive 
branch, and not to a court. The court found this argument unac-
ceptable, both in the context of the extradition treaty and in the 
context of the diplomatic and statutory backdrop against which ar-
ticle XIII was drafted. As noted above, the language of article 
XIII parallels that of article XI, which does not expressly require 
presentation of evidence to a magistrate. But the court noted that 
18 U .S.C. section 3184, requiring a judicial proceeding in all formal 
extradition requests, imposes a probable cause requirement as a 
precondition to formal extradition.132 The government's contention 
that the section 3184 requirement of a hearing applies to article XI 
but not to article XIII, when their language is so similar, was 
labeled "untenable" by the court.133 
The government's claim that the language in article XIII 
serves merely to create a power in the requested party to demand 
additional information was rejected on the ground that where the 
treaty authorizes intergovernmental communications it does so 
expressly, as in article XIV, which provides that the requested 
party may demand additional "evidence" and "information."134 The 
130. Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d at 745 (citing 26 U.S.T. 493, 501, T.I.A.S. No. 8052). 
131. Id. at 745. 
132. Id. at 7 45-46. 
133. Id. at 746. 
134. Id. (citing 26 U.S.T. 493, 502, T.l.A.S. No. 8052). 
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court reasoned that since an article XI request concerns 
"evidence" and an article XIII request concerns "information", ar-
ticle XIV encompasses both kinds of requests. Therefore, in light 
of article XIV, the government's contention that article XIII 
serves only to create a power to demand additional information 
would render that portion of article XIII "mere surplusage."135 
The court's reasoning here is flawed, because article XIV 
specifically refers to "additional evidence or information to enable 
[the requested party] to decide on the request for extradition" 
(emphasis added). There is no reference to requests for provi-
sional arrest, and it is possible to assume that "information" as 
well as "evidence" might be required in making the decision 
whether to extradite. 
The court proceeded to note that other American treaties 
authorize provisional arrest in "urgent" cases without a "further 
information" requirement.136 Therefore, provisional arrest provi-
sions fall into one of two categories: those with and those without 
the informational requirement. The fact that, faced with such a 
choice, the drafters of the extradition treaty elected to include the 
requirement, buttresses the conclusion that presentation of "such 
futher 'information" as might be needed to justify arrest (e.g., a 
showing of probable cause) is a necessary condition for provisional 
arrest under the United States-Italy treaty.137 
Finally, the government contended that since article XI clear-
ly requires a showing of probable cause, to infer the existence of 
such a requirement from the similar language of article XIII would 
eradicate the distinctions between the two procedures, thereby 
defeating the drafters' intention to provide a more "streamlined" 
mechanism for accommodating requests from foreign nations than 
"full-blown extradition proceedings."138 
In response to this argument, the court noted that the con-
templated proceedings do indeed differ in several crucial 
respects, 139 but that the draftsmen did not intend to streamline the 
135. Id. at 746 n.14. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 747. 
139. The differences between provisional arrest and formal extradition proceedings 
are as follows: 
(a) Article XIII requires "information," listing no formalities for its provi-
sions. Since time is of the essence in an "urgent" case, the court found that applica-
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article XI procedure at the expense of sacrificing the protection of 
the probable cause requirement.140 It is the procedural differences 
between the provisional arrest proceeding and the formal extradi-
tion proceeding that make it unnecessary to sacrifice a probable 
cause requirement in the former in order to distinguish the two. 
On the basis of "overwhelming evidence," the court held that 
article XIII prohibits provisional arrest without probable cause, 
disposing of the case on the ground that the treaty language 
seems "clearly to require [a showing of probable cause]."141 By 
holding that article XIII prohibits provisional arrest without prob-
able cause, the court avoided the question whether the Constitu-
tion mandates a probable cause determination before a provisional 
arrest. Nevertheless, the court commented on the constitutional 
question in dicta.142 
The court was troubled by two features of the provisional ar-
rest mechanism. First, the government had asserted that the 
United States could detain the petitioner under provisional arrest 
for forty-five days without a showing of probable cause, yet peti-
tioner had no guarantee that his detention would end, either with 
release or formal extradition to Italy, when the forty-five day 
period expired. Extradition proceedings which end in the 
arrestee's release from custody do not bar subsequent extradition 
demands by the requesting state on the same charge.143 Under the 
tion for provisional arrest may be made wholly by telecommunications. This con-
clusion is supported by 18 U.S.C. § 3187, which expressly provides for "telegraphic 
request" for provisional arrest. 
Article XI, on the other hand, requires "evidence" and necessarily implies a 
greater procedural formality than provision of "information." Unlike article XIII, 
article XI requires certified depositions establishing probable cause and a copy of 
the actual arrest warrant issued by the magistrate in the requesting state. 
(2) Article XIII allows direct communication between Italian and American 
law enforcement officials, whereas article XI calls for transmission of depositions 
and warrants through diplomatic channels prior to their relay to law enforcement 
officials. 
(3) Under article XI, the requesting state must "prove," not allege (as under) 
article XIII), that the relator is the person named in the warrants, and must pro-
vide extensive documentation of its law regarding the particular offense, detailing 
"the law defining the offense, the law prescribing the punishment for the offense, 
and the law relating to the limitation of legal proceedings or the enforcement of 
the penalty for the offense." 26 U.S.T. 493, 501; T.I.A.S. No. 8052. 
140. Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739, 797 (2nd Cir. 1980). 
141. Id. at 742. 
142. Id. at 7 48. 
143. Treaty, art. XIV, 26 U.S.T. 493, 502; T.I.A.S. No. 8052. 
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government's view, a foreign state could request, and the govern-
ment effectuate, the unlimited detention of the arrestee through a 
series of forty-five-day provisional arrests-without a judicial 
determination of probable cause and without any formal extradi-
tion request.144 Second, any suggestion that aliens are accorded 
"lesser" rights under the Constitution is not determinative, as the 
treaty applies to American citizens and aliens alike. Acceptance of 
the government's interpretation of article XIII as not requiring a 
showing of probable cause would result in the government having 
the ability to arrest and indefinitely detain an American citizen 
simply upon the allegation by a foreign government that a war-
rant for the arrest of that citizen was outstanding.145 These 
features "[raise] grave questions concerning the constitutional pro-
priety of any interpretation of article XIII which does not require 
a showing of probable cause."146 
Two months before deciding Caltagirone, the Second Circuit 
spoke in dictum about the constitutional requirements for extradi-
tion proceedings in Rosado v. Civiletti.141 "[T]o the extent that the 
United States itself acts to detain [the arrestee] pending extradi-
tion, it is bound to accord him due process."148 The court noted that 
although the United States Constitution does not limit the power 
of a foreign sovereign to prescribe the procedures for trial and 
punishment of crimes committed within its own territory, "it does 
govern the manner in which the United States may join the 
effort." 149 In this sense, Rosado and Caltagirone reflect a consis-
tent view of the role of the United States Constitution and the 
federal judiciary in criminal cases which involve transnational in-
stitutions. While the extraterritorial reach of the Constitution is 
limited, certain constitutional guarantees inhere whenever United 
States courts or officials play a role in the apprehension or deten-
tion of an individual, whether citizen or alien. 
2. ROSADO V. CIVILETTI 
Rights of United States Citizens Under the United States-Mexico 
Prisoner Transfer Treaty - Voluntariness of Consent to Transfer 
144. 629 F.2d at 747. 
145. Id. at 748. 
146. Id. 
147. 621 F.2d 1179, discussed infra at pp. 186-97. 
148. Id. at 1195. 
149. Id. at 1195-96. 
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Agreements - Waiver of Prisoner's Right to Challenge Conviction 
-Balancing the Habeas Corpus Privilege Against the Threatened 
Viability of the Prisoner Transfer Treaty 
The question of the scope of constitutional rights possessed 
by United States citizens who have been convicted of crimes, im-
prisoned in foreign countries and subsequently transferred to 
United States prisons pursuant to prisoner transfer treaties has 
been presented frequently to federal courts.150 The Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals gave the most comprehensive consideration of 
the subject to date in Rosado v. Civiletti. 151 
Petitioners, three United States citizens, were arrested in 
Mexico, tortured, denied even the semblance of a fair trial, and in-
carcerated under inhumane conditions.152 After petitioners had 
been imprisoned for two years, the United States and Mexico con-
cluded and signed a prisoner transfer treaty.153 Under the treaty, a 
prisoner transferred to prisons within his home country must 
waive any right to seek a modification or reversal of the sentence 
or conviction in his home nation's courts.154 Stated another way, 
150. Pfeifer v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 615 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1980); Mitchell"· 
United States, 483 F. Supp. 291 (E.D. Wis. 1980); Orozco v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 
No. CV78-2485 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 1979); Isbell v. United States Bureau of Prisons, No. CV78-
2400-LEWT (C.D. Cal. July 30, 1979); Ruiz v. Bell, No. 79-16 (M.C. Pa. June 29, 1979). 
151. Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3248 
(1980). 
152. Petitioners testified at trial to the following events: Petitioners Caban and Velez 
were arrested in Mexico City while on a stopover en route to Acapulco. Six armed men in 
civilian clothes executed the arrest without a warrant, searched the two men and tortured 
them by beating and use of an electric cattle prod. Petitioner Rosado arrived in Mexico two 
days later and suffered similar treatment. Each petitioner was taken to a detention center 
and given a confession to sign, which all three refused to do. None of the petitioners were 
informed of the charges against them, nor were any allowed to obtain legal counsel. For 
months they were kept in prison, during which time they were subjected to torture, forced 
labor, and extortion. When the three were finally brought to trial, it lasted for less than fif-
teen minutes. There was neither a judge nor a jury present and only the arresting officers 
testified. Petitioners were not allowed to speak or to have counsel present. The trial 
violated numerous provisions of the Mexican Constitution. See CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE 
LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANIS, tit. I, chap. I, art. 20 Mexico. Eight months after the trial, 
petitioners were informed they had been sentenced to nine years imprisonment for conspir-
ing to import cocaine. The search conducted at the time of arrest did not reveal any nar-
cotics. 
Petitioners' testimony was uncontroverted by the government and the court found the 
testimony to be credible. Velez v. Nelson, 427 F. Supp. 865, 867, n.3 (D. Conn. 1979), rev'd 
sub nom. Rosado v. Civiletti, 621F.2d1179 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3248 (1980). 
153. Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, done Nov. 25, 1976, United 
States-Mexico 28 U.S.T. 7399, T.I.A.S. No. 8718 (effective Nov. 30, 1977) [hereinafter cited 
as U.S.-Mexico Treaty). 
154. Id. at art. VI. 
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under the treaty, the receiving state has no jurisdiction to review 
the judicial process of the transferring state. Representatives of 
the United States embassy in Mexico visited petitioners and in-
formed them of the possibility of transfer to a United States 
prison.155 Petitioners expressed interest in transferring and later 
appeared before a United States magistrate who determined that 
petitioners voluntarily and knowledgeably consented to transfer .156 
The petitioners were then transferred to a federal prison in Con-
necticut. 
Once their transfers were complete, petitioners sought writs 
of habeas corpus in federal district court.157 The district court 
granted the writs on the ground that the consent to transfer given 
by the petitioners was involuntary .158 On the basis of its reading of 
two relatively recent United States Supreme Court decisions,159 
the court held that only in light of "all the surrounding cir-
cumstances" could voluntariness be determined.160 The uncon-
troverted facts of petitioners' mistreatment throughout their in-
carceration led the court to conclude that petitioners' consent to 
transfer and their resultant waiver of any right to challenge their 
convictions was invalid.161 The United States, the court held, could 
not lawfully retain custody over petitioners.162 
155. Each petitioner was given a booklet prepared by the United States Department of 
Justice explaining the provisions of the treaty and the consequences of taking advantage of 
the transfer opportunity. 
The booklet specifically advised that because the Treaty gave Mexico exclusive 
jurisdiction over actions brought by transferees to challenge, modify, or set aside 
sentences imposed by its courts, a United States citizen who transferred to 
American custody would not have any legal remedies available in the United 
States to challenge, modify, or set aside his conviction or sentence. The booklet 
went on to state, however, that neither the Treaty nor its implementing legislation 
"seeks to prevent transferring offenders from bringing habeas corpus actions to 
challenge the constitutionality of the Treaty and/or the implementing legislation, 
or the manner of the execution of their confinement by United States authorities." 
Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d at 1188 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INFORMATION BOOKLET FOR 
UNITED STATES CITIZENS INCARCERATED IN MEXICAN PRISONS 7 (1977)). 
156. Id. at 1189. 
157. Id. at 1182. 
158. Velez v. Nelson, 475 F. Supp. at 874. 
159. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 
(1975). 
160. Velez v. Nelson, 475 F. Supp. at 873. 
161. Id. at 874. 
162. Id. 
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The district court's decision immediately threatened any 
future transfer of United States prisoners from Mexican jails.163 
The United States Government promptly appealed the decision 
and the Mexican government continued the transfer program 
pending an appellate decision in the case.164 
In order that the reader understand the issues presented to 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and the rationale used by the 
court in resolving those issues, it is necessary to describe briefly 
the salient features of the United States-Mexico prisoner transfer 
treaty, which is the model for other similar treaties concluded be-
tween the United States and foreign nations.165 
In 1976, the United States State Department began to 
negotiate bilateral prisoner transfer treaties. The treaty with 
Mexico was negotiated and signed in November, 1976 and went in-
to force a year later.166 Eligibility for transfer requires that the 
prisoner's offense not fall within an excluded category167; the of-
fense must be punishable in the prisoner's home state168; there 
must be at least six months remaining in the prisoner's sentence169; 
and no appeal can be pending in the transferring state.110 If these 
eligibility requirements are satisfied, the transfer procedure may 
be initiated by the transferring state.111 The mechanics of prisoner 
transfers are set forth in the treaty. Free and informed consent by 
the prisoner to the terms of the transfer is required under the 
163. See interview with Salvador Compos, Minister, Mexican Embassy, in Washington, 
D.C. (March 11, 1980) reported in Note, "The Impact of Rosado v. Civiletti on U.S. Prisoner 
Transfer Treaties", 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 131, 151 (1980). 
164. Id. 
165. Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, done March 2, 1977, United States 
-Canada, 30 U.S.T. 6263, T.l.A.S. No. 9552 (effective July 19, 1978); Treaty on the Execution 
of Penal Sentences, done Feb. 10, 1978, United States-Bolivia, 30 U.S.T. 796, T.l.A.S. No. 
9219 (effective Aug. 17, 1978); Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, done Jan. 11, 
1979, United States - Panama,_ U.S.T. _, T.l.A.S. No. 9787 (effective June 27, 1980); 
Treaty on the Enforcement of Penal Judgments, done June 7, 1979, United States - Turkey, 
_ U.S.T. _, T.l.A.S. No. 9892 (effective Jan. l, 1981); Treaty on the Execution of Penal 
Sentences, done July 6, 1979, United States - Peru,_ U.S.T. _, T.l.A.S. No. 9784 (ef-
fective July 21, 1980). 
166. United States - Mexico Treaty, supra, note 153. 
167. Id. at art. 11(4): The exclusions include prisoners under a death sentence, military 
offenses, political offenses and immigration offenses. 
168. Id. at art. 11(1). 
169. Id. at art. 11(5). 
170. Id. at art. 11(6). 
171. Id. at art. IV(l). 
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treaty .112 If the prisoner consents and both states approve, the 
transfer is effectuated. The most controversial of the terms of the 
transfer treaties is illustrated by article VI of the United States-
Mexico treaty: 
The Transferring State shall have exclusive jurisdiction over 
any proceedings, regardless of their form, intended to challenge, 
modify or set aside sentences handed down by its courts. The 
Receiving State shall, upon being advised by the Transferring 
State of action affecting the sentence, take the appropriate ac-
tion in accordance with such advice. 173 
Although transferees must waive any right to challenge their 
sentences, they gain a significant advantage upon transfer by hav-
ing the opportunity for early parole in the United States.174 
While acknowledging that petitioners' convictions 
"manifested a shocking insensitivity to their dignity as human be-
ings and were obtained under criminal process devoid of even a 
scintilla of rudimentary fairness and decency ,"175 the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals nonetheless reversed the decision of the 
district court and denied _relief. In a lengthy opinion, Judge Kauf-
man examined the constitutional issues of due process and con-
sent. 
The first issue considered by the court was the issue upon 
which the district court had disposed of the case: whether the peti-
tioners' consents to transfer176 had been voluntary. The district 
court, relying on Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,111 held that the con-
sents were not voluntary. The United States Supreme Court in 
Schneckloth rejected a static definition of voluntariness, 
172. Id. at art. IV(2). 
173. Id. at art. VI. 
174. United States - Mexico Treaty, supra, note 153, art. V(2) provides that "the com-
pletion of a transferred offender's sentence shall be carried out according to the laws and 
procedures of the Receiving State, including the application of any provisions for reduction 
of the term of confinement by parole, conditional release or otherwise." 
175. Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F .2d at 1182. 
176. The first issue focused on the petitioners' consent to transfer only. This is signifi-
cant to an understanding of the court's opinion for two reasons. First, the issue of the volun-
tariness of the consent to transfer should not be confused with the issue of the voluntariness 
of the waiver of any right to challenge the conviction and sentence in United States courts, 
treated later in the opinion. Second, the question of the voluntariness of the consent to 
transfer can be reviewed by the court under the terms of the treaty. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, 
INFORMATION BOOKLET FOR UNITED STATES CITIZENS INCARCERATED IN MEXICAN PRISONS 7 
(1977). 
177. 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
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characterizing the question of voluntariness as one "of fact to be 
determined from all the circumstances."178 The district court fo-
cused its attention not on compliance with the consent re-
quirements of the transfer treaty, but on the treatment of peti-
tioners during their pretrial and post trial incarceration in Mexico. 
The court held that the length of petitioners' detention, the nature 
of the questioning to which they were subjected, and the occur-
rence of physical punishment rendered petitioners' consent in-
valid.179 Although the court held that the United States did not 
have lawful custody over petitioners, the United States made no 
effort to return petitioners to Mexico nor did Mexico seek such a 
return.180 
The Second Circuit reversed. The court, rather than focusing 
on the circumstances of petitioners' convictions and incarceration, 
focused on compliance with the statutory procedures governing 
transfer of prisoners. These procedures "are carefully structured 
to ensure that each [petitioner] voluntarily and intelligently 
agreed to forego his right to challenge the validity of his Mexican 
conviction .... "181 The court rejected the lower court's reliance on 
Schneckloth, pointing out that the policy considerations underly-
ing the holding in that case were not apposite here. First, the rule 
in Schneckloth was designed to "define the degree to which 
overzealous law enforcement would be deterred, and individual 
rights vindicated."182 Such a goal would be ineffective in the con-
text of the transfer treaty, since United States courts cannot alter 
the methods of law enforcement in Mexico.183 
178. Id. at 248-49. 
179. Velez v. Nelson, 475 F. Supp. at 873-74. 
180. The treaty does not require the receiving country to return prisoners in the event 
of some defect in the transfer proceeding or for any other reason. However, 18 U.S.C. § 
4114(a) (1976 Supp.) states that: 
Upon a final decision by the courts of the United States that the transfer of the of-
fender to the United States was not in accordance with the treaty or the laws of 
the United States and ordering the offender released from serving the sentence in 
the United States the offender may be returned to the country from which he was 
transferred to complete the sentence if the country in which the sentence was im-
posed requests his return. 
The treaty does not give the transferring state a legal right to demand return of such an of-
fender. 
181. Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d at 1182. 
182. Id. at 1189. 
183. Id. The United States Constitution does not protect American citizens from the 
governmental acts of foreign states. Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 122 (1901). 
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Second, the liberty interests involved in Schneckloth are in 
no way related to the liberty interests present in Rosado. Accord-
ing to the court, a more precise analogy exists between the in-
terests of petitioners and those of accused defendants offered a 
choice between pleading guilty (where the sanction is guaranteed) 
and going to trial (where the precise nature of the sanction, if any, 
is unknown). The court analyzed cases involving guilty pleas in 
light of two issues. The first was whether the choice facing peti-
tioners unconstitutionally conditioned a constitutional right.184 The 
court concluded that the requirement of a waiver of the right to 
challenge the foreign conviction was "neither needless or ar-
bitrary" and thus that the condition was permissible.185 Second, 
the court considered whether the consent to transfer was an in-
formed and intelligent act done with a full awareness of the situa-
tion.186 The choice facing petitioners was between continued in-
carceration under brutal conditions in Mexico or transfer to the 
United States, conditioned upon waiver of any right to challenge 
the Mexican conviction in United States courts. Faced with this 
choice, "if the instant petitioners' consents to transfer are viewed 
184. One commentator has described the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions as 
follows: 
Generally, the doctrine states that while a government, state or federal, may not 
be obligated to provide its citizens with a certain benefit or privilege, it may not 
grant the benefit or privilege on conditions requiring the recipient in some manner 
to relinquish his constitutional rights. Furthermore, it cannot withhold or cancel 
the benefit as a price for the assertion of such rights. 
Robbins, A Constitutional Analysis of the Prohibition Against Collateral Attack in the 
Mexican-American Prisoner Exchange Treaty, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1, 37 (1978). 
The court looked to United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), in considering 
whether the provisions of the prisoner transfer treaty impermissibly conditioned a constitu-
tional right. In that case, the court invalidated a provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act 
allowing imposition of the death penalty only when recommended by a jury, holding that the 
provision "needlessly" induced defendants to waive the constitutional right to a jury trial. 
Id. at 583. In a later case, the court emphasized that a condition is impermissable only if it 
"needlessly penalize[d] the assertion of a constitutional right." Brady v. United States, 397 
U.S. 742, 746 (1970) (citing United States v. Jackson). 
185. Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d at 1200. The court identified three important in-
terests of the government in requiring the waiver: acceptance of the treaty by Mexico re-
quired waiver of the right to challenge (id. at 1200); good relations between the United 
States and Mexico were supported by "honoring [Mexico's] criminal convictions and 
recognizing the integrity of its criminal justice system" (id. at 1190); and Americans held in 
Mexican prisons benefitted by the transfer treaty (id. at 1200). 
186. Id. at 1191 (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)). The situation as 
described by the court included circumstances surrounding the choice, the likely conse-
quences of the choice, and all available alternatives. 
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in light of the alternatives legitimately available to them, it cannot 
be seriously doubted that their decisions were voluntarily and in-
telligently made." 187 
Having determined that petitioners' consents to transfer 
were voluntary, the court turned to the due process issue raised 
by petitioners. The challenge to the prisoner transfer treaty was 
thus posed by Judge Kaufman: whether the United States govern-
ment may imprison a citizen in execution of a foreign criminal con-
viction and deny that citizen access to a United States court to 
challenge the fundamental fairness of the criminal process which 
led to his conviction.188 After concluding that the prisoner transfer 
treaty was a valid exercise of the treaty-making power,189 the 
court considered whether the treaty violated any procedural or 
substantive constitutional guarantees.190 While it is well estab-
lished that the government may punish citizens only in accordance 
with the due process guarantees of the Constitution,191 the ques-
tion whether those guarantees require that any person have a 
right of access to a United States court to test the basis for imposi-
tion of a sentence has never been fully resolved.192 After reviewing 
187. Id. 
188. Id. at 1192. 
189. Id. at 1193. The court recognized that the courts of a country are not required to 
execute the penal laws of another country. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825). 
However, a country may choose to extend recognition to such penal laws. Rosado v. Civilet-
ti, 621 F.2d at 1192. The instant treaty does not call for United States enforcement of Mex-
ico's penal laws but simply provides for execution of a Mexican criminal conviction. The 
treaty serves two purposes which render it a valid exercise of the treaty-making power 
under art. II § 2, cl.2 of the Constitution: the condition of Americans imprisoned in Mexican 
jails is ameliorated and relations between Mexico and America are improved by lessening 
the burden on the Mexican criminal system. Id. at 1193. 
190. The court focused specifically on the fifth and sixth amendments. The fifth amend-
ment states: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury ... nor shall any person ... 
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... 
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The sixth amendment provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury ... and to be informed of the nature and cause of 
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining Witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
Counsel for his defense. 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
191. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 119 (1866). 
192. Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d at 1194. 
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cases outlining the nature and extent of process due American 
citizens who have committed crimes abroad and foreigners sought 
to be extradited by their governments, 193 the court concluded that 
"[t]he right to a fair procedure reasonably calculated to produce a 
correct determination of the· basis for the imposition of penal sanc-
tions lies at the heart of the due process of law protected by the 
Fifth Amendment."194 Therefore, petitioners here have the right to 
test in a United States court the basis for their continued confine-
ment in a United States prison.195 
Having determined that the petitioners had such a right, the 
court considered whether petitioners were estopped from assert-
ing that right based upon their agreement to the conditions of the 
transfer, one of which was giving up any right to challenge the 
conviction in their national courts. The court pointed to Congress' 
effort to insure that prisoners seeking transfer would be fully in-
formed of the treaty's provisions and would agree to abide by such 
provisions.196 The treaty requires express agreement by the 
prisoner to challenge the conviction or sentence in Mexican courts 
only .197 In light of the stringent consent requirement, the court 
points out, it is unlikely that either Mexico or the United States 
would have consented to petitioners' transfer had petitioners not 
consented to abide by the treaty's conditions. 198 The court did not 
find this fact alone determinative of the question whether peti-
tione'rs should be estopped on the basis of this agreement from 
challenging their convictions in the United States. Rather, the 
government had to show that it relied to its detriment upon peti-
tioners' agreement. Thus the court pursued a dual analysis: first, 
whether the petitioners voluntarily and intelligently agreed to 
challenge their convictions in Mexican courts only, and second, 
193. Id. at 1194-97. 
194. Id. at 1197. 
195. Id. The court made clear that its holding did not imply that every element of due 
process "as known to American criminal law" must be met in a foreign criminal proceeding 
in order for Congress to give a conviction arising out of such proceeding a binding effect 
within the United States. Id. at 1198. Rather, the holding only applies where a petitioner is 
incarcerated under federal authority pursuant to a foreign conviction, in which case he "can-
not be denied all access to a United States court when he presents a persuasive showing 
that his conviction was obtained without the benefit of any process whatsoever." Id. 
196. Id. 
197. S. 1682, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 U.S.C. § 4108(b)(l) (1977). 
198. Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d at 1199. 
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whether the United States advanced a sufficiently important in-
terest to hold petitioners to their agreement.199 
The court found petitioners' decision to agree to abide by the 
treaty's condition of a restricted right of review to be both inform-
ed and intelligent in light of the alternatives available to them,200 
and held that the choice presented petitioners did not "needlessly 
penalize" the constitutional right to a United States forum. 201 The 
congressional decision to require transferring prisoners to abide 
by the limitation on their right to a judicial review of their convic-
tions in the United States was "neither needless nor arbitrary."202 
Two strong government interests flow from requiring that 
transferring prisoners so agree.203 First, the treaty represented a 
lessening of tensions between the United States and Mexico.204 Se-
cond was the interest of those Americans still incarcerated in 
Mexican prisons.205 This factor may have been most compelling to 
the court. 
We refuse to scuttle the one certain opportunity open to 
Americans incarcerated abroad to return home, an opportunity, 
we note, the benefit of which [petitioners] have already received. 
In holding these petitioners to this bargain, we by no means con-
done the shockingly brutal treatment to which they fell prey. 
Rather, we hold open the door for others similarly victimized to 
escape their torment.206 
In Rosado, the court was placed in the unenviable position of 
being called upon to reconcile two strong United States policies 
that appeared to clash. The United States Constitution provides, 
in clear and unambiguous language, "[t]he Privilege of the Writ of 
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of 
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety requires."207 The prisoner 
transfer treaty between the United States and Mexico fashions a 
199. Id. 
200. At this point the court's discussion intersects with its treatment of the volun-
tariness of petitioners' consent to transfer. See note 176 supra. 
201. Id. at 1200, applying the test set forth in Jackson. See note 184, supra. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. at 1200-01. 
207. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 9, cl. 2. 
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delicate balance of the interests of both nations the United 
States interest in removing its citizens from inhumane treatment 
and harsh conditions in Mexican jails and the Mexican interest in 
assuring that Americans convicted of crimes within Mexican ter-
ritory are punished. An essential feature of that balance is the re-
quirement that prisoners transferred pursuant to the treaty waive 
any right to challenge their convictions or sentences in United 
States courts. 
Constitutional questions regarding the prisoner transfer 
mechanism of the treaty were raised and debated even before the 
treaty entered into force. Indeed, such questions were raised dur-
ing hearings on the treaty by members of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee.208 Testimony before the Committee uniform-
ly supported the constitutionality of the treaty.209 These constitu-
tional questions stimulated academic debate as well.210 
The court's thoughtful consideration of the constitutional 
questions presented in Rosado, and particularly its careful reading 
of the relevent provisions of the treaty, may put the constitutional 
debate to rest or at least focus it more narrowly upon what the 
treaty actually allows and prohibits. In considering whether the 
petitioners' consent to transfer was voluntary, the court, unlike 
the district court, took a focused view of the circumstances under 
which prisoners face the choice available under the treaty. By the 
nature of the district court's definition of petitioners' situation, 
that court essentially reviewed the conviction and sentence of the 
Mexican court, an inquiry which is expressly prohibited by the 
treaty. By requiring that the petitioners' consent to the transfer 
procedure be intelligently and knowledgeably made at the time 
transfer is being considered without direct reference to or con-
sideration of the acts of Mexican judicial or penal authorities, the 
208. See Penal Treaties with Mexico and Canada: Hearings on Exec. D and Exec. H 
before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). 
209. Id. at 46-50, 85, 86, 90-130. 
210. See, e.g., Abramovsky, A Critical Evaluation of the American Transfer of Penal 
Sanctions Policy, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 25; Abramovsky and Eagle, A Critical Evaluation of the 
Newly Ratified Mexican-American Transfer of Penal Sanctions Treaty, 64 IOWA L. REV. 
275, 302-16 (1979); Paust, The Unconstitutional Detention of Mexican and Canadian 
Prisoners by the United States Government, 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 67 (1979); Robbins, 
A Constitutional Analysis of the Prohibition Against Collateral Attack in the Mexican-
American Prisoner Exchange Treaty, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1 (1978); Vagts, A Reply to "A 
Critical Evaluation of the Mexican-American Transfer of Penal Sanctions Treaty," 64 IOWA 
L. REV. 325 (1979). 
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circuit court honored the terms of the treaty. In addition, the 
court's holding avoided the absurd result that would have followed 
from the district court's analysis. According to that court's ra-
tionale, those who suffer the most by repressive treatment at the 
hands of the Mexican criminal justice system could never make a 
truly voluntary decision to accept transfer to United States 
prisons and thus those who would most benefit could not take ad-
vantage of the transfer mechanism. In fact, faced with the choice, 
a number of American prisoners in Mexican jails have chosen to 
remain in Mexico and challenge their convictions through that 
country's courts.211 
The Second Circuit's disposition of the due process challenge 
is equally well-reasoned. By holding that any American in-
carcerated in United States prisons has a right to access to United 
States courts to challenge the basis of that incarceration, the court 
reinforced the fundamental right of habeas review preserved by 
the Constitution. It is a well established principle that constitu-
tional rights may be waived.212 By requiring that petitioners' con-
sent to waive their habeas right to challenge the Mexican convic-
tion meet basic requirements for voluntariness, the court was 
able, in a principled way, to preserve the prisoner transfer treaty. 
The humanitarian goal underlying the treaty was preserved 
without sacrificing constitutionally protected rights. 
B. Civil Matters 
1. FILARTIGA v. PENA-IRALA 
Torture Violates the Law of Nations - Under the Alien Tort 
Claims Act, United States Federal District Courts Can Hear Tort 
Claims Based on Acts of Torture - Claims Based on Violations of 
the Law of Nations Arise Under the Laws of the United 
States-Forum Non Conveniens-Sovereign Immunity-The Act 
of State Doctrine - Choice of Law-The Scope of Plaintiffs' 
Rights Under the Alien Tort Claims Act 
211. Indeed, one man, convicted with petitioners, chose not to transfer and appealed 
his conviction, which was overturned for lack of evidence. Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d at 
1189, n.29. For a discussion of reasons why a potential transferee might elect to remain in 
Mexican prisons, see Abramovsky and Eagle, supra note 210, at 298. 
212. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (waiver of right to counsel); Fay v. Noia, 
372 U.S. 391 (1963) (waiver of right to habeas relief). 
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In one of the most important Survey-year cases involving 
principles of international law,213 the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit held that torture conducted by agents of a foreign 
government is violative of the law of nations, and that tort claims 
based upon such activity fall within the subject matter jurisdiction 
of the federal district courts, under provisions of the Alien Tort 
Claims Act.214 In doing so, the court elevated the protection of 
human rights over principles of national sovereignty and outlined 
an expanded role for federal courts in the interpretation and ap-
plication of international law. 
A wrongful death claim was brought in federal district court 
by Dr. Joel Filartiga against the Inspector General of Police in 
Asuncion, Paraguay, Americo Norberto Peiia-Irala, alleging that 
the claimant's son had died as a result of torture inflicted upon 
him in Paraguay by the defendant.215 Subject matter jurisdiction 
213. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
213a. Id. at 887. 
214. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as§ 1350 or the Act]. The Act was 
originally codified in 1789 as part of the First Judiciary Act. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 
9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789). 
215. The Filartiga litigation arose out of events alleged to have taken place in the 
Republic of Paraguay in 1976. Joelito Filartiga, a seventeen year old boy, was allegedly kid-
napped and tortured to death by Americo Norberto Pena-Irala, who was then the Inspector 
General of Police in Asuncion, Paraguay. On the same day, Asuncion police officers brought 
Dolly Filartiga, Joelito's sister, to Pena's home to view the multilated body of her brother. 
Joelito's father, Dr. Joel Filartiga, had been an opponent of Alfredo Stroessner, president of 
Paraguay, and the Filartiga family believed Joelito was tortured and killed in retaliation 
against his father's political activities. 
Shortly after the murder of his son, Dr. Filartiga commenced a criminal action against 
Pena and the police in Paraguayan courts. As a result, Filartiga's attorney was arrested by 
the police and threatened with death by Pena. As of March 1980, when the Court of Appeals 
decided Filartiga, the criminal proceeding was still pending in Paraguay. During the 
Paraguayan proceeding, another man, a member of the Pefta household, confessed to the 
murder, claiming it was a crime of passion. The Filartigas produced pictures of the corpse to 
refute this claim. Despite the confession, the man evidently has never been convicted. Filar-
tiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 878. 
In 1978, Pena sold his home in Paraguay and gained admittance to the United States 
under a visitor's visa. He remained in the United States beyond the term of his visa, living 
in Brooklyn, New York with a companion. Dolly Filartiga, who was living in Washington, 
D.C. at the time, learned of his whereabouts and informed the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service of Pena's presence in New York. The Service arrested him and, after a hearing, 
ordered him deported. 
While Pena was awaiting deportation at the Brooklyn Naval Yard, he was served with 
process and a civil complaint filed by the Filartigas. The complaint alleged that he had 
wrongfully caused Joelito Filartiga's death by torture and sought $10,000,000 in compen-
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was averred upon a number of grounds, including the Alien Tort 
Claims Act, which grants original district court jurisdiction over 
"any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation 
of the ·law of nations or a treaty of the United States."216 
Acknowledging that "official torture violates an emerging norm of 
international law ,"211 the trial court nevertheless dismissed the 
claim,218 holding that under Second Circuit precedents the statute 
does not confer jurisdiction over claims based upon a foreign 
state's treatment of its own nationals.219 Appeal was taken to the 
satory and punitive damages. In addition, the complaint sought to enjoin Pena's deporta-
tion. The cause of action was based upon: 
wrongful death statutes; the U.N. Charter; the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights; the U .N. Declaration Against Torture; the American Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Man; and other pertinent declarations, documents and prac-
tices constituting the customary international law of human rights and the law of 
nations .... " 
Id. at 879. 
216. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976). The Act has been invoked rarely. In those cases in which it 
was averred as a jurisdictional base, jurisdiction was sustained in only two. Bolchas v. Dar-
rell, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1796); Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 
1961). Those courts denying jurisdiction have given the three elements of the act - alienage, 
a cause of action in tort only, and a violation of the law of nations or of a treaty - an extreme-
ly narrow construction. Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied 429 
U.S. 835 (1976); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975); Abiodun v. Martin Oil Ser-
vice, Inc. 475 F.2d 142 (7th Cir. 1973); Damaskinos v. Societa Navigacion Interamericana, 
S.A., Panama, 255 F. Supp. 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schroder, 225 F. 
Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Khedivial Lines, S.A.E. v. Seafarers' International Union, 278 
F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1960). 
The Filartigas' complaint also sought to base jurisdiction upon the presence of a federal 
question, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and upon 28 U.S.C. §§ 1651, 2201 & 2202. Filartiga v. Pei\a-Irala, 
630 F .2d at 878 n.3. 
217. Filartiga v. Pefta-Irala, No. 79-C-917, Memorandum & Order 4 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 
1979). 
218. The dismissal was based upon lack of subject matter jurisdiction and thus the 
court did not reach the forum non conveniens challenge that was also raised by Pena. See p. 
202 infra. 
219. The precedent followed by the district court was Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 
24 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976), and IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d 
Cir. 1975). In Vencap, the court adopted dictum from an earlier § 1350 case to the effect 
that: 
[A] violation of the law of nations arises only when there has been "a violation by 
one or more individuals of those standards, rules or customs (a) affecting the rela-
tionship between states or between an individual and a foreign state, and (b) used 
by those states for their common good and/or in dealings inter se." 
519 F.2d at 1015. In Dreyfus, the court stated in dictum that "violations of international law 
do not occur when the aggrieved parties are nationals of the acting state." 534 F.2d at 31. 
The effect of Dreyfus and Vencap was to restrict severely the scope of applicability of the 
Act and thus to render it virtually a dead letter for alien litigants. 
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Second Circuit Court of Appeals,220 which, having heard oral argu-
ment and having received a joint opinion from the Departments of 
Justice and State in support of jurisdiction,221 unanimously re-
versed and remanded the case for trial. 222 
The court recognized that, lest "the courts of one nation 
might feel free to impose idiosyncratic legal rules upon others, in 
the name of applying international law ,"223 section 1350 could not 
be invoked as the basis for jurisdiction unless the claimant had 
alleged a violation of some rule, within the current content of in-
ternational law, which commanded "the general assent of civilized 
nations."22' After discussing the principle that states' treatment of 
their nationals was a matter of international concern,225 noting the 
"authoritative statements of the international community" 
specifically prohibiting torture,226 and reviewing other documents 
evidencing the international consensus regarding the illegality of 
torture,227 the court concluded that "there are few, if any, issues in 
international law today on which opinion seems to be so united as 
the limitations on a state's power to torture persons held in its 
custody ."228 Further, the court reasoned that the rule of interna-
tional law prohibiting torture "admits of no distinction between 
treatment of aliens and the treatment of citizens."229 Thus, the 
Alien Tort Claims Act conferred federal jurisdiction over the 
Filartiga's claim, unless the statute itself was found to be un-
constitutional. 
The relevant portion of the United States Constitution, 
limiting the congressional grant of jurisdiction to inferior federal 
courts, states that "the judicial power shall extend to all cases ... 
arising under ... the laws of the United States."230 Defendant had 
220. Plaintiffs' effort to stay Pefta's deportation was successful prior to the district 
court decision. After the decision, plaintiffs were unsuccessful in obtaining further stays 
and with the failure of these efforts, Pefta returned to Paraguay before the Second Circuit 
rendered its decision. Filartiga v. Pefta-Irala, 630 F.2d at 880. 
221. Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, id. at 876. 
222. Id. The opinion was authored by Judge Irving Kaufman. 
223. Id. at 881. 
224. Id. (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 694 (1900)). 
225. 630 F.2d at 881-84. 
226. Id. at 883. 
227. Id. at 881-84. 
228. Id. at 881. 
229. Id. at 884. 
230. U.S. CONST., art. III,§ 2. 
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argued that a claim alleging violation of international law is one 
"arising under" United States law only if Congress had acted to 
codify such international rule within its own legislative enact-
ments.231 Plaintiff had argued that section 1350 itself was such 
legislation, defining actionable offenses violative of the law of na-
tions.232 The court rejected defendant's contention and found it un-
necessary to rule on plaintiff's suggested interpretation of con-
gressional intent.233 
The court held that a claim "arises under ... the laws of the 
United States," if it is grounded upon either congressional enact-
ments or upon the common law of the United States.234 Because 
the law of nations became a part of the common law of the. United 
States upon the adoption of the Constitution, a claim concerning a 
violation of international law "arises under" United States law, as 
required for the constitutional exercise of federal court jurisdic-
tion. The premise was supported by the statement of Chief Justice 
Marshall that, in the absence of congressional enactment, courts of 
the United States are "bound by the law of nations which is a part 
of the law of the land."235 
Having thus determined that the application of the Alien Tort 
Claims Act to the Fi/,artiga claim was constitutionally valid, the 
court refrained from deciding whether the statute itself, aside 
from the transfusion of international law rules into the common 
law of the United States, supported a finding that the claim arose 
under United States law: "[W]e believe it is sufficient here to con-
strue the Alien Tort Statute, not as granting new rights to aliens, 
but simply as opening the federal courts for adjudication of the 
rights already recognized by international law."236 
a. Future Problems 
Fi/,artiga paved the way for suits brought in federal courts to 
redress violations of international law. Because the case presented 
the circuit court with a narrow jurisdictional issue only, there re-
main a number of questions left unanswered by the court's deci-
231. 630 F.2d at 884. 
232. Id. at 887. 
233. Id. at 886-87. 
234. Id. at 886. 
235. The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 422 (1815). 
236. Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d at 887. 
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sion that will likely arise in future section 1350 suits. The discus-
sion below focuses on a few of these questions. It would be im-
possible in a survey of this type to consider these questions in 
great depth. As a result, the following discussion is intended simp-
ly to identify legal problems likely to arise in section 1350 suits, to 
speculate on the resolution of such problems, and to identify 
ramifications of alternative resolutions. 
b. Forum Non Conveniens 
The district court dismissed the suit solely on the basis of 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction and therefore the forum non 
conveniens issue raised by Pena in the proceedings below was not 
before the circuit court. The appellate court spoke briefly to the· 
issue in dictum, however: 
[W]e note that the foreign relations implications of this and 
other issues the district court will be required to adjudicate on 
remand underscores the wisdom of the First Congress in vesting 
jurisdiction over such claims in the federal district courts .... 
Questions of this nature ... should not be left to the potentially 
varying adjudications of the courts of the fifty states.237 
It is not likely that in raising the forum non conveniens issue Pena 
was seeking a state, as opposed to a federal, forum in the United 
States. Rather, he probably contemplated dismissal of the suit in 
favor of a Paraguayan forum. However, a dismissal on forum non 
conveniens grounds requires not only an alternative forum, but an 
effective alternative forum. 
Dismissal on the basis of forum non conveniens requires that 
there be in fact an alternative forum in which the suit can be 
maintained. It must appear to a certainty that jurisdiction of all 
parties can be had and that complete relief can be obtained in 
the supposedly more convenient court.238 
The Filartigas' unsuccessful efforts to bring the alleged murderer 
of their son to justice in Paraguay probably would have defeated 
Pena's forum non conveniens motion. 
Courts faced with section 1350 claims in the future will 
doubtless have to rule on forum non conveniens motions. It seems 
237. Id. at 890. 
238. 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE,§ 3828, at 
179 (1976) (emphasis added). 
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probable that such motions will fail. By the very nature of section 
1350 suits, most of the evidence and witnesses will be in another 
forum, and it is at least possible that the laws of a foreign state 
will provide the rule of decision for the case.239 These factors 
weigh in favor of the foreign state being a more convenient forum. 
However, where the basis of the suit is the violation of the law of 
nations, requiring, as it does, a severe personal wrong committed 
by a governmental official within the alternative forum, the court 
may be predisposed to retain jurisdiction. Motions to dismiss on 
forum non conveniens grounds will have a better chance of suc-
cess in those cases in which the violation arises out of an isolated 
incident in the foreign state, the plaintiff has not sought redress in 
the courts of that state, and officials of that state indicate a will-
ingness to ensure that justice is available. 
c. Sovereign Immunity 
Another question, unanswered by Filartiga, is the extent to 
which the doctrine of sovereign immunity will protect a defendant 
from a suit under the act. Sovereign immunity is available, under 
certain circumstances, to shield a foreign state and its governmen-
tal officers from suit in United States courts. The doctrine, 
judicially recognized in 1812,240 was codified by the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA).241 The FSIA was enacted in 
part to make the judiciary rather than the executive branch (in 
particular, the State Department) responsible for determining the 
validity of immunity claims. 242 The general rule under the FSIA is 
that a foreign state, its agents and instrumentalities are immune 
from the jurisdiction of state and federal courts. 243 Thus, an alien 
defendant in a suit brought under section 1350 may successfully 
avoid a trial on the merits if he falls within the coverage of the 
FSIA.244 
Although the language of the FSIA suggests that defendants 
may be shielded from suit under section 1350, there are political 
reasons why claims of immunity by such defendants may not sue-
239. See p. 207-09 infra. 
240. The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). 
241. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a), (2)-(4), 139l(f), 1441(d), 1602-11 (1976). 
242. Id. at § 1602. 
243. Id. at §§ 1603-04. 
244. The FSIA contains a number of exceptions to the immunity it otherwise offers. 
See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a){l)-(5) (1976). 
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ceed. Pefia did not claim immunity and thus the application of the 
FSIA to him was not in issue. The nature of the case against him 
however, will amply illustrate the problem section 1350 defen-
dants will have in seeking immunity from suit. Section 1603 of the 
FSIA extensively defines those entities that, for the purposes of 
the act, are characterized as agents or instrumentalities of the 
foreign state to which immunity is available.245 Although that sec-
tion does not expressly require authorization of defendant's con-
duct by the foreign state, the language of the section does suggest 
that an agency relationship between the state and individual is en-
visioned.246 Torture is expressly prohibited under Paraguayan law 
and Pefia could not point to any official government policy enabl-
ing him to violate that law.247 Therefore, the strength of his im-
munity claim would depend upon some indication by the 
Paraguayan government that he was acting as its agent in perform-
ing the alleged act. In light of the heinous nature of the crime 
alleged to have been committed by Pefia and the domestic and in-
ternational censure likely to accompany any effort by the 
Paraguayan government to accept responsibility for his action, it 
is highly unlikely that the government would acknowledge 
authorization of the act or ratify the act once committed. In fact, in 
any case involving gross violations of human rights, the govern-
ment whose official is sued is most likely to distance itself from 
that official and his actions. Far from accepting responsibility, the 
government can be expected to disclaim both authorization and 
knowledge of the action. As a result, a defendant's claim of im-
munity probably will fall on unsympathetic ears within his na-
tional government, thus obviating the court's resolution of the 
issue. 
d. Act of State 
Pefia did argue before the Second Circuit court that "[i]f the 
conduct complained of is alleged to be the act of the Paraguayan 
government, the suit is barred by the Act of State doctrine."248 
Because the argument was not raised before the lower court, the 
circuit court did not decide the issue. However, the court noted in 
dictum that it doubted whether: 
245. Id. at 1603(a). 
246. Id. 
247. See Filartigo v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d at 889. 
248. Id. 
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action by a state official in violation of the Constitution and laws 
of the Republic of Paraguay, and wholly unratified by that na-
tion's government, could properly be characterized as an act of 
state .... Paraguay's renunciation of torture as a legitimate in-
strument of state policy, however, does not strip the tort of its 
character as an international law violation, if it in fact occurred 
under color of government authority .249 
The Act of State doctrine, while not before the court in Filartiga, 
is likely to be raised in other suits against government officials 
under section 1350. 
The classic statement of the Act of State doctrine is found in 
Underhill v. H ernandez:250 
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of 
every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will 
not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another 
done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of 
such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed 
of by sovereign powers as between themselves.250a 
In essence, the doctrine aids both federal and state courts in 
determining under what circumstances they may properly ad-
judicate the validity of foreign acts of state. As the United States 
Supreme Court noted in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,251 
the seminal case on the Act of State doctrine as currently applied, 
the doctrine is not compelled either by "the inherent nature of 
sovereign authority" or by principles of international law .252 
Rather, the doctrine has constitutional underpinnings. "It arises 
out of the basic relationships between branches of government in 
a system of separation of powers. It concerns the competency of 
dissimilar institutions to make and implement particular kinds of 
decisions in the area of international relations."253 The genesis of 
and justification for the Act of State doctrine is important because 
it gives the courts flexibility in deciding when exercise of judicial 
power is appropriate in reviewing acts of foreign states. The court 
recognized this flexibility in Sabbatino when it suggested a 
249. Id. at 889-90 (citations omitted). 
250. 168 U.S. 250 (1897). 
250a. Id. at 252. 
251. 376 u .s. 398 (1964). 
252. Id. at 421. 
253. Id. at 423. 
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number of considerations to be balanced in evaluating whether the 
doctrine should be applied. Chief among these considerations are 
the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular 
area of international law, and the extent to which judicial involve-
ment would interfere with the executive's conduct of foreign rela-
tions.254 
Application of both these factors in section 1350 suits should 
lead to the conclusion that the Act of State doctrine is not a bar to 
the exercise of judicial power. First, the plaintiff in section 1350 
suits must establish that the tort violates the law of nations. As 
the court's opinion in Fi'lartiga indicates,255 the task of showing 
that an international norm can properly be labeled a "law of na-
tions" is a difficult one. That is, plaintiff must show a substantial 
consensus, supported by at least some codification, that the norm 
is to be treated as a binding rule of law. Thus the very test for 
establishing subject matter jurisdiction under section 1350 
similarly establishes one of the chief factors involved in the Act of 
State analysis. The second factor also would have been satisfied in 
Filartiga. The United States State Department has indicated that 
the likelihood of conflict between the executive and judicial 
branches is reduced when the court is called upon to apply prin-
ciples of international law that have been widely accepted by the 
international community.256 Where clear violations of human rights 
are alleged, it is likely that, in light of the increasing concern for 
human rights expressed by recent administrations,257 inter-branch 
friction is averted by courts interpreting the Act of State doctrine 
narrowly rather than broadly. One of the interesting aspects of 
any increased use of section 1350 as a basis for subject matter 
jurisdiction over violations of human rights after Filartiga may be 
the position taken with regard to Act of State challenges to sec-
254. Id. at 428. The court proceeds to explain that: 
It should be apparent that the greater the degree of codification or consensus con-
cerning a particular area of international law, the more appropriate it is for the 
judiciary to render decisions regarding it, since the courts can then focus on the 
application of an agreed principle . . . rather than on the sensitive task of 
establishing a principle not inconsistent with the national interest or with interna-
tional justice. Id. 
255. Filartiga v. Pei\a-Irala, 630 F.2d at 881. 
256. Appendix 1 to the opinion of the court in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. 
Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 709-11 (1976). 
257. See remarks of President Carter reported in 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 
2161-65 (July 3, 1978). 
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tion .1350 suits by the Reagan administration. Since courts tradi-
tionally seek a statement from the State Department when faced 
with Act of State questions, the administration's conception of the 
relatively limited role to be played by the United States in inter-
national human rights issues258 may be reflected in State Depart-
ment responses more supportive of judicial deference to the valic!i-
ty of sovereign acts by foreign governments. 
The availability of the Act of State doctrine to limit judicial 
inquiry into the acts of foreign officials may pose a problem for 
plaintiffs in section 1350 suits similar to that posed by the asser-
tion of sovereign immunity by defendants.259 In order for a viola-
tion of international law to occur, a state must be in some way im-
plicated in the violation. However, if the defendant commits the 
section 1350 tort in his official capacity as an officer of the state, in 
some cases the Act of State doctrine will bar the suit. As commen-
tators on the Filartiga decision have pointed out,260 this dilemma is 
a superficial one. The court in Filartiga noted briefly that the 
dilemma is resolved by distinguishing the level of authorization re-
quired to characterize the violation as one implicating the state as 
well as the individual actor for the purpose of triggering the ap-
plication of international law, from the kind of authorization that 
would raise the violation to an act of state.261 This resolution has a 
parallel in United States domestic law in the "under color of state 
law" language of 42 U.S.C. sections 1981-83 as distinct from state 
action itself. 262 
e. Choice of Law 
Perhaps the most immediate question left open by Filartiga is 
the choice of law to be applied by the lower court in deciding the 
merits of the case. The question is particularly difficult because of 
the language employed in section 1350. One element of that sec-
tion requires a cause of action in tort only. If the court were to 
258. See Reagan interview reported in 17 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 234-368 (March 9, 
1981). 
259. See pp. 203-04 supra. 
260. Blum & Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International Human Rights 
Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act after Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 53, 108 
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Blum & Steinhardt]. 
261. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 889-90. The exact language of the court is 
quoted in the introductory paragraph to this act of state discussion at p. 205 supra. 
262. See Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 260 at 110 n.240. 
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focus on the fact that a tort action is presented, it might be likely 
to apply traditional choice of law rules and thus would choose the 
law of the situs or of any place where sufficient contacts were 
established.263 In essence, a section 1350 claim would be treated 
like any other tort claim. But section 1350 is also directed against 
"violations of the law of nations" .26aa Focus on this element would 
suggest that international law is to be applied. 
There are inhere.nt problems in applying either state or inter-
national law as the rule of decision. The laws of the state where 
the violation occurred may not favor a tort action based on the 
underlying facts, particularly where the suit is against a govern-
ment official. The other alternative, using general international 
law as the rule of decision, is problematic because international 
law is not yet sufficiently detailed and refined to provide the 
various elements of the cause of action or to identify clearly the 
defenses that might be available to the defendant. The federal 
court would be in the position of creating general federal common 
law supposedly grounded in international law. To the extent that 
other nations are suspicious of the treatment an alien will receive 
in the American courts or simply hostile to Western legal tradi-
tions and principles, a federal court fashioning rules of decision 
based on international law could inadvertently create interna-
tional tension. International comity might suffer, with the 
foreseeable result that Americans find themselves tried abroad on 
the basis of an understanding of international law totally foreign 
to the Western legal mind.264 
The court was not called upon to decide the choice of law 
issue in Fi"lartiga. It did comment on the problem, however. First, 
in responding to Pefia's argument that the customary law of na-
tions is not self-executing and thus cannot provide the rule of deci-
sion, the court said: 
263. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws employs a test which balances such fac-
tors as the situs of the injury, the predominant situs of the parties and the domicile of the 
parties in determining the law to be applied in tort actions. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
FLICT OF LA ws § 145 (1971). This choice of law rule represents a change from that articulated in 
the first Restatement which simply applied a "situs of the injury" test. RESTATEMENT OF 
CONFLICT OF LAWS§§ 377-83 (1934). 
263a. 28 U .S.C. § 1350 (1976). 
264. For a more detailed discussion of the choice of law problems presented by § 1350 
see Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 260, at 97-103 (1981). 
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[H]e confuses the question of federal jurisdiction under the 
Alien Tort Statute, which requires consideration of the law of na-
tions, with the issue of the choice of law to be applied .... The 
two issues are distinct. Our holding on subject matter jurisdic-
tion decides only whether Congress intended to confer judicial 
power, and whether it was authorized to do so by Article III. The 
choice of law inquiry is a much broader one, primarily concerned 
with fairness; consequently, it looks to wholly different con-
siderations. 265 
209 
The court clearly indicated that the "violation of the law of nations" 
language of section 1350 is jurisdictional only and does not re-
quire the application of a particular substantive law. Indeed, the 
court recognized that any one of three sources might be chosen: 
the law of the forum, the law of the situs, or the law of nations.266 
The court gave particular attention to the effect of choosing the 
law of Paraguay. This subject deserved the additional attention 
because of the potential conflict between applying the law of a par-
ticular foreign state and the court's resolution of the constitu-
tionality of the federal courts applying the law of nations under ar-
ticle III. The court resolved the conflict by distinguishing between 
the jurisdictional question and the application of a particular 
source of law to the merits. Once it is determined that jurisdiction 
is established under section 1350, that is, that the tort alleged 
violates the law of nations, the case properly "arises under" the 
laws of the United States for the purposes of article III. A subse-
quent decision to use foreign law, although resulting in a cause of 
action not "created" by a law of the United States, does not 
retroactively deprive the district court of jurisdiction. 267 
f. Other Violations Under the Act 
In Filartiga, official torture was held to violate the law of na-
tions.2678 The court was not called upon to and did not indicate 
what other kinds of conduct might violate the law of nations and 
thus fall within the scope of section 1350. However, the court 
recognized that the law of nations is continually evolving and that 
265. Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d at 889 (citations omitted). 
266. Id. 
267. Id. at n. 25. 
267a. Id. at 884. 
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the types of violations encompassed by section 1350 "will be a sub-
ject for continuing refinement and elaboration."268 
In reaching its conclusion that torture violated the law of na-
tions, the court elucidated what is required to raise a general 
standard of conduct to a "law of nations". Both the language used 
by the court and the text of the international sources it cited sug-
gest the parameters of what may be required to bring other types 
of conduct under the rubric of the "law of nations". First, "[i]t is only 
where the nations of the world have demonstrated that the wrong 
is of mutual, and not merely several, concern, by means of express 
international accords, that a wrong generally recognized becomes 
an international law violation within the meaning of the statute."269 
Thus, a plaintiff suing under the act must be able to point to inter-
national agreements. These agreements must be multilateral, 
rather than bilateral. Although the above quotation does not re-
quire it, the court elsewhere in its opinion indicated that the viola-
tion need not be recognized by every nation on earth. It is suffi-
cient that the standard expressed represent the "general assent of 
civilized nations."210 Thus, as the court pointed out, expropriation 
of foreign-owned property does not rise to the level required by 
section 1350.271 Although expropriation without adequate compen-
sation is recognized by many Western nations as a violation of in-
ternational law, it is not so recognized by socialist nations or by 
many developing nations, and thus does not command sufficient in-
ternational recognition to be labeled a law of nations. Although 
not expressed directly in either the statute or the opinion of the 
court, it is probable that section 1350 requires international 
agreements that are mandatory rather than recommendatory in 
nature. This requirement is supported by the types of interna-
tional accords the court relied upon in concluding that torture 
violated the law of nations. The relevant sections of the United 
Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Being Subjected 
268. Id. at 885. 
269. Id. at 888. 
270. Id. at 881. The court's use and discussion of the term "general assent of nations" 
suggests not only a substantial majority of nations but, within that majority, inclusion of na-
tions representing the widely varied political, economic and social values that characterize 
modern international society. 
271. 630 F.2d at 881. See also, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 
(1964). 
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to Torture, the American Convention of Human Rights, the Inter-
national Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, and the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, employ mandatory language in prohibiting torture.272 
The mandatory nature of such provisions stands in contrast to 
pronouncements in international instruments which speak of 
general obligations on the part of states or simply recommend 
standards of conduct to states.273 
Applying the requirement of express international agree-
ments, mandatory in nature, and generally consented to by na-
tions, it would appear that only prohibitions against genocide and 
slavery, in addition to prohibitions against torture, rise to the 
level required by section 1350. Both genocide and slavery are pro-
hibited by numerous international accords similar to those pro-
hibiting torture.274 Both are rejected by the principles and pur-
poses of the United Nations.275 
Perhaps the most significant feature of the court's decision in 
Filartiga .is the recognition that international law is dynamic 
rather than static and that, therefore the coverage of section 1350 
will not be static. "It is clear that courts must interpret interna-
tional law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists 
among the nations of the world today ."276 In light of the activity of 
the General Assembly and other international organizations 
directed toward the "progressive development of international 
law", the scope of international concern, and eventually of interna-
272. U.N. CHARTER. art. 55, 59 Stat. 1033 (1945); Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, art. 5, 30 U.N. GAOR, Annexes 535-41, U.N. Doc. A/777 (1948); Declaration on the 
Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment, G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 91, U.N. Doc. A/1034 
(1975); American Convention on Human Rights, art. 5, OAS Treaty Series No. 36 at 1, OAS 
Off. Rec. OEA/Ser 4 v/11 23, doc. 21, rev. 2 (1975); International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, G.A. Res. 220 (xxi)A, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 3, Council of Europe, Euro-
pean Treaty Series No. 5 (1968), 213 U.N.T.S. 211. 
273. See e.g., Security Council resolutions "inviting" states to influence South Africa to 
end apartheid. S.C. Res. 190, 19 SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/INF/19/Rev. 1, at 12-13 (1964). 
274. Genocide: Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 272, art. 2; Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. 
Slavery: Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 272, art. 5; International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 272, arts. 6, 7. 
275. U.N. CHARTER; art. 1, para. 2 (to develop friendly relations among nations based on 
respect for the principle of ... self-determination of peoples); art. 1, para. 3. 
276. Filartiga v. Pei'ia-Irala, 630 F.2d at 881. 
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tional law, is likely to expand continuously and perhaps exponen-
tially. Where human rights are involved, the court in Filartiga has 
paved the way for those expanded rights to be redressed in the 
federal courts of the United States. 
2. IIT v. CORNFELD 
Federal Courts' Exercise of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over 
Transnational Security Dealings - Defining the Scope of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 - Historical Interpretation of 
the Securities Exchange Act - Balancing United States and 
Foreign Interests 
Over the last decade, the Second Circuit has decided a 
number of important cases277 involving the extraterritorial reach 
of the antifraud provision, Rule lOb-5278, promulgated under sec-
tion lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.279 In one of the 
most complex Survey-year cases, ITT v. Cornfeld,280 the court fur-
ther articulated the guidelines to be used in determining when 
federal courts may assert subject matter jurisdiction over 
transnational security dealings. 
The 1934 Act does not contain any provision defining its ex-
traterritorial reach, and the legislative history of the act is devoid 
of any consideration of the question, probably because the current 
nature and extent of transnational securities dealings was not 
foreseen or contemplated by the Congress in 1934. Therefore, in 
determining the appropriate tests for exercising subject matter 
jurisdiction over alleged Rule lOb-5 violations involving parties or 
transactions outside the United States, federal courts turned to 
two principles of state jurisdiction set out in the Restatement 
(Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States.281 
First is the "subjective territorial" or "conduct" principle which 
founds jurisdiction upon conduct within the state's territory.282 
277. Arthur Lipper Corp. v. SEC, 547 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 
1009 (1978); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F .2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, 
Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975); Leasco Data Processing Equip-
ment v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972). 
278. 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1980). 
279. 15 U.S.§§ 78a-78hh (1976). 
280. IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980). 
281. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
(1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]. 
282. Id. at§ 17: 
Jurisdiction to Prescribe with Respect to Conduct, Thing, Status, or Other 
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Second is the "objective territorial" or "effects" principle which 
bases jurisdiction upon conduct outside a state causing an effect 
within the state if: 
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as 
constituent elements of a crime or tort under the law of states 
that have reasonably developed legal systems, or 
(b) (i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of 
activity to which the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the ter-
ritory is substantial; (iii) it occurs as a direct and foreseeable 
result of the conduct outside the territory; and (iv) the rule is not 
inconsistent with the principles of justice generally recognized 
by states that have reasonably developed legal systems.283 
The two principles support jurisdiction independently: that is, if 
either the subjective principle (conduct) or the objective principle 
(effects) applies, jurisdiction may properly be exercised. Both 
bases have been relied upon by the Second Circuit in pre-Cornfeld 
cases to give extraterritorial reach to Rule lOb-5 and section lO(b) 
of the 1934 Act. 
a. Case Law Prior to Cornfeld 
The "effects" (objective territorial) principle was first · relied 
on to support jurisdiction over the subject matter of a lOb-5 suit in 
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook.284 In Schoenbaum the court held that 
Rule lOb-5 applies to transactions involving stock registered and 
listed on a national stock exchange which take place outside the 
United States, if such transactions are harmful to the interests of 
American investors.285 A later opinion by the Second Circuit286 sug-
Interest within Territory 
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law 
(a) attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs within its territory, 
whether or not such consequences are determined by the effects of the conduct 
outside the territory, and 
(b) relating to a thing located, or a status or other interest localized, in its ter-
ritory. 
283. Id. at § 18. 
284. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd in part and remanded, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en 
bane), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). 
285. 405 F.2d at 208. The language of the case indicating an "effects" analysis was 
drawn from the Supreme Court's opinion in Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911). 
Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimen-
tal effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the harm as if [the ac-
tor] had been present at the [time of] the effect .... 
286. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2nd Cir. 
1972). 
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gested that the holding in Schoenbaum should not be expansively 
applied. In Leasco v. Maxwell, the court refused to base jurisdic-
tion solely on the fact that the injured party was an American cor-
poration. The court was doubtful that "Congress meant to impose 
rules governing conduct throughout the world in every instance 
where an American company bought or sold a security ."287 Leas co 
severely weakened the authority of, but did not overrule, Schoen-
baum. The only other case in which the "effects" principle provid-
ed the exclusive jurisdictional ground is Des Brisay v. Goldfield 
Corp.,288 in which the court focused on the fact that the securities 
involved were listed on a national exchange and the American 
market was harmed.289 
Employment of the "effects" principle as a basis for subject 
matter jurisdiction is problematic due in large part to the poten-
tial foreign relations implications of an expansive ~onception of 
"effects." This is particularly true in light of the incidence of 
multimillion dollar international transactions which are bound to 
have significant effects in a number of nations. Overuse of the "ef-
fects" principle might result in American corporations being forc-
ed to defend suits throughout the world should other nations, tak-
ing offense at intrusions in their economic affairs by federal 
courts, decide to employ a similar basis for the jurisdiction of their 
courts. As Chief Justice Burger recognized in The Bremen v. 
Zapata Off-Shore Co. 290: 
[T]he expansion of American business and industry will hardly 
be encouraged if ... we insist on a parochial concept that all 
disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts .... 
We cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and inter-
national waters exclusively on our own terms, governed by our 
laws, and resolved in our courts. 
Perhaps it is these effects of the objective principle that have led 
most courts ruling on the extraterritorial reach of Rule lOb-5 and 
287. 468 F.2d at 1334. See also Continental Grain Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 
F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1979). 
288. 549 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1977). 
289. 549 F.2d at 136. It is significant to note that only one of the plaintiffs in Des Brisay 
was American. 
290. 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972). See also, Sandberg, The Extraterritorial Reach of American 
Economic Regulation: The Case of Securities Law, 17 HARV. INT'L L.J. 315, 326 (1976). 
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section lO(b) to employ the "conduct" principle wherever possible 
as a basis of jurisdiction. 
The "conduct" or "subjective" territorial principle supports 
subject matter jurisdiction over a transnational security trans-
action if some conduct in relation to that dealing takes place 
within the Untied States.291 The cases prior to Cornfeld applying 
the "conduct" test can best be understood by differentiating 
among three kinds of fact patterns in which it is employed: sales of 
securities to American residents in the United States, resulting 
from the conduct of foreigners in the United States; sales of 
securities to foreigners outside the United States; and sales of 
securities to Americans residing abroad. 292 
The Second Circuit in Leasco articulated what has been a 
uniform view of federal courts confronting the first factual situa-
tion of a resident American injured by the conduct of a foreigner 
in the United States: 
[W]e must ask ourselves whether, if Congress had thought about 
the point, it would not have wished to protect an American in-
vestor if a foreigner comes to the United States and fraudulently 
induces him to purchase foreign securities abroad- a purpose 
which its words can fairly be held to embrace.293 
The second kind of factual pattern raising the question of the 
extraterritorial reach of Rule lOb-5 and section lOb involves con-
duct within the United States which causes loss to foreigners. 
Although a number of federal courts have dealt with this type of 
case,294 the Second Circuit has given the most comprehensive con-
291. RESTATEMENT at§ 17 (1965). 
292. See, Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 
423 u .s. 1018 (1975). 
293. 468 F.2d at 1337. See also, Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 
1973); Garner v. Pearson, 374 F. Supp. 580 (M.D. Fla. 1973). The court indicated in Leasco 
that conduct by a foreigner in the United States harming another foreigner might not sup-
port the exercise of jurisdiction: "The case is quite different from another hypothetical we 
posed at argument, namely, where a German and a Japanese businessman met in New York 
for convenience, and the latter fraudulently induced the former to make purchases of 
Japanese securities on the Tokyo Stock Exchange." 468 F .. 2d at 1338. 
294. Continental Grain Pty. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1979); SEC v. 
Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977); United States v. Cook, 573 
F.2d 281 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1978); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., Inc., 540 F.2d 
591 (3d Cir. 1976); SEC v. United Financial Group, Inc., 475 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1973); SEC v. 
Gulf Intercontinental Finance Corp., 223 F. Supp. 987 (S.D. Fla. 1963). 
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sideration to the question.295 In IIT v. Vencap, the court concluded 
that Congress had not "intended to allow the United States to be 
used as a base for manufacturing fraudulent security devices for 
export, even when these are peddled only to foreigners." 296 The 
court held, however, that where the victim of a fraudulent security 
dealing is a foreigner, jurisdiction can only be exercised where the 
conduct within the United States is the perpetration of the 
fradulent act, not "mere preparatory activities or the failure to 
prevent fraudulent acts where the bulk of the activity was per-
formed in foreign countries .... "297 
In Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 298 the court reiterated this 
test for establishing jurisdiction where foreigners are victimized 
by securities fraud, but indicated that a different test is employed 
to determine the appropriate exercise of jurisdiction where the 
victims are Americans residing abroad. "While merely 
preparatory activities in the United States are not enough to trig-
ger application of the securities laws for injury to foreigners 
located abroad, they are sufficient when the injury is to 
Americans so resident."299 In order to exercise jurisdiction over 
section lOb and Rule lOb-5 suits arising from injury to Americans 
residing abroad, it is only necessary that the conduct within the 
United States materially contribute to the injury.300 
Thus, prior to Cornfeld, the "conduct" test for the extrater-
ritorial reach of the securities laws was a tripartite examination. 
Cornfeld eroded the distinction between two factual situations 
previously significant to the courts. 
b. The Cornfeld Decision 
Although the factual history of Cornfeld is complex, a general 
outline of the parties and major transactions involved in the suit is 
required to understand fully the legal conclusions reached by the 
court. The plaintiff is IIT, an international investment trust, which 
was organized under the laws of Luxembourg. IIT was controlled 
295. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 
519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975). 
296. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d at 1017. 
297. Id. at 1018. 
298. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975). 
299. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d at 992. 
300. Id. at 993. 
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and managed by IIT Management Company, S.A., a Luxembourg 
corporation, which was controlled by Investors Overseas Services, 
Ltd. (IOS), incorporated in Canada. The latter two companies were 
controlled by Bernard Cornfeld and were operated out of Switzer-
land. The suit arose out of three allegedly fraudulent acquisitions 
by IIT of securities issued by companies controlled by an Ameri-
can, John M. King. First, IIT acquired debentures, issued in 
Europe, of a Netherlands Antilles subsidiary of l<ing Resources 
Company (KRC), a publicly owned Maine corporation. Second, IIT 
purchased King Resources Company common stock in the United 
States over-the-counter market. This purchase was made through 
the brokerage services of the Arthur Lipper Corporation. Third, 
IIT directly purchased a convertable note from The Colorado Cor-
poration (TCC), which was privately owned by King. The 
gravamen of the complaint was that these acquisitions were part 
of a conspiracy to defraud IIT by those in control of IOS, Lipper 
and the King companies.301 
Considering the jurisdictional question as to whether Rule 
10b-5's extraterritorial reach encompassed these transactions, the 
district court first applied the "effects" or "objective territorial 
principle" and rejected that basis for jurisdiction.302 The court 
noted that "an unparticularized deleterious effect on the American 
economy resulting from the IOS collapse- i.e., a damaged ability 
to attract offshore investment funds -is not sufficient."303 The 
court also stated that a de minimus number of American citizen 
shareholders would not create a jurisdictionally sufficient effect in 
the United States.304 The Second Circuit agreed that the effects 
within the United States were not sufficient to support the asser-
tion of jurisdiction. 305 
The district court then turned to the "subjective territorial 
principle" and focused on whether there was sufficient conduct 
within the United States to support jurisdiction. The court began 
with the principle that "in the context of a suit by a foreign plain-
tiff ... the jurisdictional significance of the defendants' allegedly 
301. IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 914-15 (2d Cir. 1980). 
302. IIT v. Cornfeld, 462 F. Supp. 209, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (citing Bersch, 519 F.2d at 
998-99). 
303. Id. 
304. Id. 
305. IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d at 917. 
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domestic fraudulent acts must be considered in the context of the 
plaintiffs' theory of the case."306 Plaintiffs' theory, according to the 
court, was based upon alleged fraud upon foreign fundholders by 
foreign management, aided and abetted by actors within the 
United States (principally John M. King). The acts of the "aiders 
and abettors" were "preparatory or secondary" to the fraud 
perpetrated by foreign actors. 
When the scheme finds its genesis abroad, however, with a 
group of foreign managers of a foreign investment trust 
violating what would appear to be their fiduciary duties to their 
fundholders, and the foreign managers merely enlist the aid of 
American aiders and abettors, then the prospect of applying 
federal law to the transactions is drastically changed.307 
Thus, having characterized the theory of the case as one primarily 
involving a fraud perpetrated by foreign managers of IIT who 
simply enlisted the aid of Americans, the district court rejected 
conduct within the United States as a basis for jurisdiction.308 
The Second Circuit disagreed. The district court's 
characterization of defendants as "aiders and ab bettors", while a 
fair description of the role of the accountant, the underwriter, and 
Lipper, was not an accurate description of members of the King 
complex and other defendants, who, plaintiffs claimed, were 
perpetrators of the fraud. Thus, the aiding and abetting related to 
a deception originating in the United States. According to the 
court, "[a]n actual participant in a fraud is no less a principal 
because someone else originated the plan."309 
The court did not find it difficult to find a basis for the exer-
cise of jurisdiction over IIT's purchase of KRC's common stock 
and the TCC convertable note, as both were essentially domestic 
transactions.310 In fact, the only foreign element in these transac-
tions was the transmission of orders from outside the United 
States by foreign purchasers. A more difficult question was 
presented by the debentures of the Netherlands Antilles sub-
sidiary of KRC. The debentures were not registered under the 
306. IIT v. Cornfeld, 462 F. Supp. at 220. 
307. Id. at 225. 
308. Id. at 226. 
309. IIT v."Cornfeld, 619 F.2d at 918. 
310. Id. 
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1934 Act and were purchased in the European market rather than 
in the United States. 
The court began its analysis of the debenture transaction by 
restating its conclusion in Bersch that the anti-fraud provisions of 
the Securities Act "[d]o not apply to losses from sales of securities 
to foreigners outside the United States unless acts (or culpable 
failures to act) within the United States directly caused such 
losses."311 The facts in Cornfeld were then distinguished from 
those in Bersch on three principal grounds. First, the fact that 
KRC was a domestic corporation and the fact that the foreign sub-
sidiary through which the debentures were sold was merely a 
shell for KRC weighed heavily in the court's analysis.312 Bersch in-
volved the stock of a Canadian corporation. The nationality of the 
issuer was significant to the court because "Congress would have 
been considerably more interested in assuring against the 
fraudulent issuance of s~curities constituting obligations of 
American rather than purely foreign business."313 Second, the 
court emphasized that the European debenture offering was an in-
tegral part of an overall financing scheme for KRC centered in the 
United States,314 whereas in Bersch the primary offering was ex-
clusively in Europe and the secondary offering was exclusively in 
Canada.315 Finally, the court emphasized that the prospectus for 
the European debenture offering in Cornfeld had been wholly 
prepared in the United States and concluded that "[d]etermination 
whether American activities 'directly' caused losses to foreigners 
depends not only on how much was done in the United States but 
also on how much (here how little) was done abroad."316 
The nature of the court's analysis of the defendants' conduct 
suggests an erosion, or at least a blurring, of the distinction 
previously drawn by the Second Circuit between suits in which 
foreigners suffered as a result of fraudulent securities dealings 
(requiring an analysis of whether domestic activity directly caused 
311. Id. at 919. 
312. Id. The court pointed out that the Netherlands Antilles subsidiary of KRC was in-
volved in the debenture sale only for tax purposes. The subsidiary had no operating assets 
and therefore the debentures were guaranteed by, and convertible into the common stock 
of, the parent company, KRC. Id. at 919-20. 
313. Id. at 920. 
314. Id. 
315. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d at 979-80. 
316. IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d at 920-21. 
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the loss) and suits in which nonresident Americans are injured by 
fraudulent securities dealings (requiring that acts of material im-
portance in the United States significantly contribute to the loss). 
The court directed its attention to characterizing the Euromarket 
debenture transaction as "essentially American"317 instead of focus-
ing on whether the activities within the United States were "merely 
preparatory" rather than directly causal as required by Bersch 
and Vencap. In this sense, the court's analysis in Cornfeld is more 
closely akin to the standard previously articulated for use in suits 
involving Americans residing abroad. That standard requires a 
weighing of the conduct within the United States relative to 
foreign conduct and a determination of the materiality of the 
domestic activity to the fraudulent scheme. If the Second Circuit 
continues to apply the kind of analysis employed in Cornfeld to 
Rule lOb-5 and section lOb suits causing loss to foreigners, the dif-
ferent treatment accorded foreigners and Americans residing 
abroad by the tripartite test of Bersch will be eliminated. 
Outlining the parameters of the extraterritorial reach of 
United States securities laws requires a balancing of a number of 
interests. Defining the reach of federal court jurisdiction to in-
clude suits arising out of any transaction having an effect on the 
American market or suits arising from some conduct in the United 
States may needlessly intrude in the affairs of other nations with 
consequent harm to the foreign commercial and diplomatic rela-
tions of the United States. Other nations, particularly industria-
lized nations, are as likely as the United States to be concerned 
with deterring fraudulent transnational securities dealings. 
Where a particular fraudulent scheme is essentially centered in 
another nation, federal courts are wise to refuse jurisdiction, not 
only as a matter of deference to the judicial function in other na-
tions, but also to diminish the likelihood that other nations will ex-
pand the jurisdiction of their courts over fraudulent transactions 
which are essentially American. 
yet, as dangerous as . a broad exercise of jurisdiction in 
transnational securities dealings would be, a narrowly defined ex-
traterritorial reach would fail to serve both the domestic and in-
ternational interests of the United States. If federal courts are too 
reticent to exercise jurisdiction, the United States might become, 
317. Id. at 920. 
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in the words of one federal court, a "'Barbary Coast' ... harboring 
international securities 'pirates'. "318 Additionally, a failure of the 
United States to open its courts to securities fraud suits involving 
activity in the United States might "induce reciprocal responses 
on the part of other nations" to "decline to act against individuals 
and corporations seeking to transport securities fraud to the 
United States."319 
By carefully analyzing whether international transactions are 
"essentially American" in origin and direction, the court in Corn-
feld avoided the rigid tricotomy established by Bersch and struck 
the balance between American and foreign interests in a sensible 
and principled manner. 
3. RUGGIERO V. COMPANIE PERVANA DE VAPORES 
Discussion of Jury Trials in Jones Act Cases-Impact of the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 on the Right to a Jury 
Trial-The Disallowance of Jury Trials in Jones Act Cases Does 
Not Violate the Seventh Amendment 
In recent decisions, federal district courts have reached con-
flicting conclusions in resolving the question whether a United 
States plaintiff suing a foreign government-owned corporation is 
entitled to a jury trial. Most recently, the District Court for the 
Eastern District of New York held in consolidated Jones Act cases 
that plaintiffs were not entitled to a jury trial.320 
The cases are personal injury suits brought under the Jones 
Act321 by longshoremen. Defendant in each case is a shipping com-
pany wholly owned by a foreign government. Each plaintiff 
demanded a jury trial; each defendant moved to strike such de-
mand. Defendants' motions were based on the assertion that a 
jury trial is banned by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 
1976 (FSIA).322 Plaintiffs contended that the Immunities Act does 
not bar jury trials and that if it does, the act is unconstitutional 
318. SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977). 
319. Id. 
320. Ruggiero v. Companie Pervana De Vapores "Inca Capac Yupunqui," 498 F. Supp. 
10 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). 
321. 33 u.s.c. § 905(b) (1976). 
322. 28 u.s.c. § 1330 (1976). 
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under the seventh amendment. 323 The district court granted defen-
dants' motions to strike. 
The issue before the court involved the proper construction of 
28 U .S.C. section 1332(a)(2) in light of the FSIA. The FSIA amend-
ed section 1332(a)(2) by deleting reference to "foreign states." The 
section, as amended, provides jurisdiction over suits involving 
"citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state."324 In 
addition to amending section 1332(a)(2), the FSIA added to title 28 
three new sections dealing with jurisdiction over "foreign states." 
Section 1330(a) gives the district courts original jurisdiction over 
any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as to any claim 
with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity. 
Section 1332(a)(4) provides jurisdiction over suits between a 
foreign state as plaintiff and citizens of a state or different states. 
Section 1603 defines "foreign states" for the purposes of both sec-
tion 1330(a) and section 1332(a)(4).325 
The court concluded that the effect of the FSIA revisions was 
to eliminate jurisdiction under section 1332(a)(2) in suits between 
American citizen plaintiffs and foreign state defendants.326 The on-
ly jurisdictional base available to plaintiffs is section 1330(a), 
which does not provide a right to trial by jury. 327 Any other conclu-
sion, according to the court, would be contrary to congressional in-
tent.328 Congress sought to promote uniformity between suits 
323. Because the constitutionality of the Immunities Act was put in issue the Attorney 
General was given notice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2403(a). The Attorney General chose not to 
intervene in the case. Ruggiero, 498 F. Supp. at 11. 
324. Prior to enactment of the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) read: 
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the 
matter in controversy exceeds ... $10,000 ... and is between ... citizens of a 
State, and foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof .... " 
325. Section 1603(b) of title 28 defines "foreign state" to include: 
"any entity ... which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise ... a ma-
jority of whose shares ... is owned by a foreign state ... [and] which is neither a 
citizen of a State of the United States ... nor created under the laws of any third 
country." 
All defendants in Ruggiero are foreign states within this definition. 498 F. Supp. at 12. 
326. Id. 
327. Id. 
328. Id. The court quoted a House Report which stated that "[s]ince jurisdiction in ac-
tions against foreign states is comprehensively treated by the new section 1330, a similar 
jurisdictional basis under section 1332 becomes superfluous." H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong. 
2d Sess. 14, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS, 6604, 6631. 
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against the United States Government in which jury trials are 
banned329 and suits against foreign governments.330 
The court found further evidence of congressional intent in 
the provision for removal jurisdiction under the FSIA. 28 U .S.C. 
section 1441(d), added by the FSIA, allows a foreign state to 
remove to federal district court any civil action brought against it 
in a state court. The section specifically states: "Upon removal the 
action shall be tried by the court without jury ."331 Allowing plain-
tiffs a jury trial in a suit originally brought in federal court while 
denying such a trial in identical suits removed from state courts 
would "thwart Congressional intent to promote uniformity in deal-
ing with cases against foreign states."332 
Having decided that plaintiffs were barred from a jury trial, 
the court faced the constitutional issue of whether such a bar 
denied the -eonstitutional right to a jury trial protected by the 
seventh amendment, and held that Congress could constitutionally 
bar such trials. The court noted that, at the time of enactment of 
the seventh amendment, the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
would have barred plaintiffs' suits.333 Therefore, "there appears [to 
be] no basis for concluding that they would have been considered 
'suits at common law' within the meaning of the seventh amend-
ment."334 There was, therefore, no right to a jury trial in such suits 
to be affected by the FSIA.335 
At least two federal district courts considering the same 
jurisdictional question that confronted the court in Ruggiero 
reached a conflicting result. In Icenogle v. Olympic Airways 
S.A.,336 the court held that a government-owned corporation may 
be considered a "citizen of a foreign state" (section 1332(a)(2)) as 
329. 28 u.s.c. § 2402 (1976). 
330. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & 
Ao. NEWS 6611-12; Ruggiero, 498 F. Supp. at 13. 
331. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d). The question of whether a plaintiff has a statutory or constitu-
tional right to a jury trial when an action commenced in state court against a foreign state is 
removed to federal court pursuant to§ 1441(d) was presented in Herman v. El Al Israel 
Airlines, Ltd., 502 F. Supp. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The court held plaintiff had no such 
statutory or constitutional right. Id. at 280. 
332. 498 F. Supp. at 13. 
333. Id. 
334. Id. 
335. Id. 
336. 82 F.R.D. 36 (D.D.C. 1979). 
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well as a "foreign state" (section 1332(a)(4)). Therefore, jurisdiction 
could be obtained under section 1332(a)(2) in suits between 
American citizens and government-owned foreign corporations. 
The court recognized that a different result would obtain if the 
case were removed from state court pursuant to section 1441(d), 
but reasoned that the absence of the "commanding language" 
against jury trials in section 1332(a)(2) justified the different treat-
ment.3368 Finally, the court reasoned that its holding would result 
in similar treatment of foreign government corporations and 
United States government-owned corporations.336b 
In Rex v. Gia. Pervana De Vapores S.A.,337 the court followed 
the Icenogle holding and stated in dicta that since the suit 
presented a traditional tort question, any attempt by Congress to 
deprive plaintiff of a jury trial would be unconstitutional.3378 A con-
stitutional issue was avoided by a holding that jurisdiction under 
section 1332(a)(2) was not barred.337b 
The decisions in both Ruggiero and Rex were certified to the 
Court of Appeals for the Second and Third Circuits, respectively, 
for immediate interlocutory appeal.338 Both circuit courts gave 
leave for the appeals.339 
Characterizing the district court's opinion in Ruggiero as 
"well-considered," the Second Circuit affirmed.340 Much of the ap-
pellate court's opinion simply reiterates the statutory analysis 
undertaken by the lower court. In two respects, however, the 
opinion is valuable as an amplification of the reasoning behind the 
lower court's holding. First, the Second Circuit more clearly iden-
tified the intent of Congress in revising, through the FSIA, the 
jursidictional basis for suit against foreign states and entities in 
336a. Id. at 39. 
336b. Id. at 41. 
337. 493 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Pa. 1980). 
337a. Id. at 465. 
337b. Id. at 466. 
338. 498 F. Supp. at 13-14, 493 F. Supp. at 469. 
339. Ruggiero v. Compania Pervana de Vapores, 639 F.2d 872, 873 (2d Cir. 1981). As of 
this writing the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has not rendered an opinion in Rex. The 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is considering the same question on appeal from 
Houston v. Murmansk Shipping Co., 87 F.R.D. 71 (D. Md. 1980) and Williams v. Shipping 
Corp. of India, 489 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Va. 1980). 
340. The United States intervened on appeal, by authority of 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a), and 
submitted a brief in support of the district court's resolution of the case. 639 F.2d at 873. 
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federal courts.341 After reviewing House and Senate Reports on 
the proposed FSIA 342 the court concluded: 
The reports thus confirm what is patent from the statutory 
language - Congress wished to provide a single vehicle for ac-
tions against foreign states or entities controlled by them, to wit, 
§ 1330 and § 1441(d), its equivalent on removal, and to bar jury 
trial in each. In return for conferring upon plaintiffs this clear 
basis of jurisdiction in actions against foreign states (even in 
suits for $10,000 or less), codifying the restrictive principle of 
sovereign immunity and vesting its determination in the courts, 
§§ 1602-05, providing a feasible method of service of process, § 
1608, and authorizing execution of a judgment upon property of a 
foreign state, § 1610, Congress intended that the foreign state, 
defined broadly in § 1603, was not to be subjected to jury 
trial- a form of trial alien to most of them in civil cases and from 
which the United States, in granting consent to suit, has general-
ly exempted itself.343 
Second, the Second Circuit gave considerably more attention 
than the district court did to the plaintiffs' assertion that depriva-
tion of a jury trial in these suits would violate the seventh amend-
ment.344 The court noted that the function of the seventh amend-
ment was to preserve rather than to create a right to a jury trial. 
"[I]f the action is a common law suit or the particular issues arise 
in a common law suit, but no right of jury trial existed under the 
common law of England as to that type of action, then there is no 
right to jury trial by virtue of the Seventh Amendment."345 Plain-
tiffs could not have sued defendants at common law in 1791 and 
thus could not have had a right to jury trial. The court then con-
sidered the wisdom of straining the definition of "suits at common 
law"346 to recognize a constitutional right to a jury in these suits, 
341. 639 F.2d at 876-878. 
342. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in (1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & 
Ao. NEWS 6604; S. REP. No. 1310, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). 
343. 639 F.2d at 878. 
344. Id. at 878-881. 
345. Id. at 879 (quoting 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE , 38.-08(5] (2d ed. 1976)). See also, 
McElrath v. United States, 102 U.S. 426 (1880); Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 
(1943); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962). 
346. Plaintiffs' reply brief cited an article in which the author argued that in 1791 it 
was possible to sue the Crown in a common law action in which there was a trial by jury: 
Kirst, Jury Trial and the Federal Tort Claims Act: Time to Recognize the Seventh Amend-
ment Right, 58 TEX. L. REV. 549 (1980). The court summarizes Professor Kirst's argument at 
639 F.2d at 880 n.10. 
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and concluded that "there are sufficient reasons why newly 
authorized suits against foreign sovereigns ... are sui generis and 
should not be deemed to be within the scope of the Seventh 
Amendment's preservation of a jury trial."347 These reasons relate 
to the foreign relations interests of the United States. Congress 
could legitimately be concerned that a withdrawal of sovereign im-
munity from foreign states in certain kinds of actions would in-
terfere with the international relations of the United States 
"unless such States were accorded protection similar to what [the 
United States] had given itself."348 
If the other courts of appeals considering the proper construc-
tion of the FSIA revisions reach a contrary result to that reached 
by the Second Circuit in Ruggiero, Supreme Court review of the 
question is likely. Given the clear language of the statutes involv-
ed, and the unequivocal nature of the legislative history behind 
the FSIA, the Second Circuit's analysis should prevail. As that 
court stated in Ruggiero, 
Id. 
The courts must learn to accept that, in place of the familiar 
dichotomy of federal question and diversity jurisdiction, the Im-
munities Act has created a tripartite division- federal question 
cases, diversity cases and actions against foreign states. If a case 
falls within the third division, there is to be no jury trial even if 
it might also come within one of the other two.349 
347. 639 F.2d at 881. 
348. Id. at 880. 
Foreign countries can hardly object to the United States' subjecting them to trial 
by a judge in commercial cases when the United States itself is subject to the same 
sort of trial in its own courts and in theirs. Subjection to trial by jury, especially 
with the restraints on review of jury findings also imposed by the Seventh Amend-
ment, would be a different matter, especially since the great majority of countries 
do not use a civil jury. 
349. Id. at 876. 
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